Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Kim Brooks

2014

The Supreme Court's 2012 Tax Cases: Formalism
Trumps Pragmatism and Good Sense
Kim Brooks

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/kim-brooks/23/

The Supreme Court’s 2012
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Neil Brooks and Kim Brooks*

I. A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP
Unfortunately, the work of the Supreme Court in interpreting the
Income Tax Act1 or other tax legislation has not often been reviewed in
the Supreme Court Law Review. Although the Supreme Court chooses to
hear only a few tax cases a year, the Court‟s decisions have a profound
effect on tax law and the ability of the income tax system to achieve its
objectives. The cases the Court hears raise important issues of
substantive tax law and the approach the Supreme Court takes in
deciding these cases determines how the lower courts approach and
resolve the hundreds of cases they hear each year. These cases, in turn,
influence how the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) administers tax
legislation more generally and how taxpayers plan their affairs. Put
another way, how the Court determines tax cases influences the success
or failure of tax law in achieving its objectives.
To reveal our position fully at the outset, we take the position that
over the years the Court has done a disservice to the aspirations of our
tax system in its interpretation of the Act and other tax legislation. There
is little question, in our view, that the Canadian income tax system is less
fair, more distortionary, more complex and more incoherent than it ought
to be because of the Court‟s tax decisions and because of the approach it
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has taken to tax cases. One of the most astute observers of the Supreme
Court‟s tax work, Brian Arnold, notes, “in sharp contrast to the judicial
activism it displays in other areas of the law, the Supreme Court is
unwilling to play a serious role in the tax system”.2 This observation
might be considered something of an understatement.
Tax law is one of the government‟s most important policy instruments.
It is used by the government to ensure that the costs of government
programs are shared equitably across the entire population that benefits
from them. Thus, tax law ensures the social acceptability of citizens
discharging their moral obligations to one another through government
provision of collective goods and services, which is done more equitably
and efficiently than if those same goods and services were provided
through private markets. The government also uses the tax system to
achieve a more morally and socially acceptable distribution of income than
that which results from market forces alone. Finally, by indirectly
changing the price of particular goods and services through tax penalties,
the government uses the tax system to discourage taxpayers from engaging
in activities that impose social costs, and, through tax concessions, to
encourage taxpayers to engage in activities that provide public benefits.
Tax law is, of course, entirely statutory. There is no common law
doctrine requiring citizens to share part of their earnings with others
through government. As most people are aware, the Act is a frightfully
complicated statute. In consolidation it runs well over 1,500 pages and the
annual amendments exceed the size of most statutes. For the Act to be
imposed fairly on taxpayers it must describe the tax consequences of almost
every form of economic intercourse, from simple barter transactions to the
most complicated international corporate reorganizations. Moreover, the
Act contains well over 100 implicit spending programs designed to further
particular government public policy objectives that have nothing to do with
administering a tax system fairly, neutrally and simply.3
Even though it is highly detailed, like all statutes, the Act is full of
ambiguities, gaps and conflicts. How could it be otherwise? It is drafted
by a relatively small and rotating group of drafters, many of whom are
comparatively junior. In their work, most have time to become specialists
only in small areas of tax law. But even if they were the most senior and

2
B.J. Arnold, “Supreme Court of Canada Approves Blatant Tax-Avoidance Scheme”
(1999) 19 Tax Notes International 1813, at 1813.
3
Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations (Ottawa: Department
of Finance, 2012).
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skilled drafters it would be impossible for them to anticipate the myriad
circumstances to which their drafted provisions must apply. Moreover,
they are confronted by a much larger group of highly paid lawyers and
accountants whose job it is, in part, to abuse the tax statute for the benefit
of their clients. Hence, in the tax law-making process there is a crucially
important role for the courts. By engaging in and encouraging a most
arid legal formalism when dealing with tax cases, the Supreme Court has
made it almost impossible for the others involved in the tax law-making
process to compensate for its uninspired performance.
Over the past 30 years or so, the Court has repeatedly demonstrated
that it has no sensible or coherent theory of how to interpret tax legislation. Participants in a lively academic discussion have thoroughly
analyzed and debated the approach the Court appears to have taken to tax
cases.4 The conventional thought is that, up until the early 1980s, the
Court took a literal and strict approach. In a well-known 1984 case, Stubart Investments Ltd. v. Canada,5 the Court called for the adoption of the
so-called modern rule of interpretation in tax cases, although the Court
did not apply it in that case (indeed, the holding of the case is that Canadian courts cannot use the business purpose test to assist in minimizing
tax avoidance). The modern rule of statutory interpretation that the Court
adopted was stated by Elmer Driedger in his well-known text on the
Construction of Statutes: “[T]he words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Parliament”.6 Over the next decade, the Court was somewhat erratic in its
application of the modern approach, and in 1994 it began, once again,
deliberately and explicitly to apply the plain meaning approach exclusively.7 The consequences of this approach have been restated in
numerous cases; however, the most frequently quoted is perhaps
McLachlin J.‟s statement in Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada:
4
See, e.g., Brian Arnold, “Reflections on the Relationship Between Statutory
Interpretation and Tax Avoidance” (2001) 49:1 Can. Tax J. 1; David Duff, “Justice Iacobucci and
the „Golden and Straight Metwand‟ of Canadian Tax Law” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 525; David Duff,
“Interpreting the Income Tax Act — Part I: Interpretive Doctrines” (1999) 47:3 Can. Tax J. 464;
David Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act — Part 2: Toward a Pragmatic Approach” (1999)
47:4 Can. Tax J. 741; Jinyan Li & David Piccolo, “Reviving the Modern Rule in the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes: Baby Steps Taken in Canada Trustco, Mathew, Placer Dome and Imperial Oil” (2007)
38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 519 [hereinafter “Li & Piccolo”].
5
[1984] S.C.J. No. 25, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.).
6
Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at 87.
7
See Canada v. Antosko, [1994] S.C.J. No. 46, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 312 (S.C.C.).
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[I]t is well established in this Court‟s tax jurisprudence that a searching
inquiry for … the general object and spirit of the provision at issue can
never supplant a court‟s duty to apply an unambiguous provision of the
Act to a taxpayer‟s transaction. Where the provision at issue is clear
and unambiguous, its terms must simply be applied … .8

Then, in 2005, in Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada,9 the first
case before the Court that involved the application of the general antiavoidance rule (“GAAR”), the Court once again stated that the
appropriate approach to statutory interpretation, even in tax cases, was
the “textual, contextual, and purposive” approach. In “Reviving the
Modern Rule in the Interpretation of Tax Statutes: Baby Steps Taken in
Canada Trustco, Mathew, Placer Dome and Imperial Oil”, Jinyan Li and
David Piccolo examined four cases decided in 2005 and 2006, and
optimistically predicted that the Court was jettisoning the plain meaning
approach and moving forward with applying the modern approach.10
They urged the Court to continue along this path and to “assume a more
active role in tax law-making through interpretation”.11
Unfortunately, the authors‟ optimism was misplaced. Even in the
case in which they proposed the textual, contextual and purposive
approach, the Supreme Court stated that, “[T]he Income Tax Act remains
an instrument dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific
consequences, inviting a largely textual interpretation”.12 In subsequent
cases, the Court returned to the plain meaning approach with a
vengeance. Seldom do the Supreme Court justices search for the
purposes of the tax sections they are interpreting. They almost never
consider the consequences of their decisions in terms of the familiar tax
principles of equity, neutrality and simplicity. And they usually do not
consider, at least explicitly, whether their decision reaches a sensible or
an absurd result.
Why the Court clings so tenaciously to the plain meaning approach
in tax cases is not obvious. Perhaps it distrusts the legislative process and
this is a way of not giving effect to the objectives of Parliament. Or maybe it is concerned about its own ability to discern the purpose of tax

8
9
10
11
12

[1999] S.C.J. No. 30, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622, at para. 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shell”].
[2005] S.C.J. No. 56, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Trustco”].
Li & Piccolo, supra, note 4.
Id., at 556.
Trustco, supra, note 9, at para. 13.
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provisions or weigh the consequences of alternative interpretations in
terms of tax principles. The plain meaning approach appears to simplify
the decision-making process. It involves ascribing a meaning to words
and deducing an answer to their application on a specific set of facts. It
allows the Court to escape responsibility for the outcomes of its decisions. The results are thought to be preordained by the words the drafters
chose. The justices of the Supreme Court have suggested in several cases
that their approach to statutory interpretation in tax cases leads to greater
certainty and predictability in the application of the tax law.
Whatever the Court‟s reasons for taking a formalistic, plain meaning
approach in tax cases, it is profoundly wrong. Words do not have plain
meanings. Determining the appropriate usages of words, any words,
depends upon examining the context in which they are used. When a word
is used in a statute, that context always includes what the legislative body
was attempting to achieve in passing the statute. Moreover, with respect to
tax law, it is universally agreed upon that the purpose should be achieved
in a way that is equitable, neutral and administratively practicable. Thus,
instead of a plain meaning approach, the Supreme Court should adopt a
consequentialist or pragmatic approach to interpreting tax legislation,
recognize that its responsibility is to play a complementary role to the
legislature in furthering the objectives of the law, and acknowledge
explicitly its important and inevitable law-making role. In short, the
responsibility of judges is to reach a sensible policy result after considering
the consequences of alternative interpretations.
This is not the place to engage in an extended discussion of the definition of the formalist approach taken by the Supreme Court and what a
more pragmatic and consequentialist approach would look like. Elsewhere, one of us has argued that approaches to statutory interpretation
other than pragmatism are incoherent, and that if judges relied more on a
consequentialist approach, it would “strengthen judgments; make results
more accessible, predictable and objective; increase the efficiency of the
litigation process; allow for the improvement of legislative drafting; increase the justice, neutrality and simplicity of the tax system; and more
fully employ the unique skills and institutional competence of judges”.13

13
Neil Brooks, “The Appropriate Role of Courts in Interpreting GST Legislation:
Reflections on the Canadian Experience” (2006) 6:1 Austl. GST J. 1; see also Neil Brooks, “The
Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax Legislation” in Graeme S. Cooper, ed., Tax Avoidance
and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1997) 93.
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Justice Donald Bowman was a judge of the Tax Court of Canada
from 1991 to 2005 and Chief Justice from 2005 to 2008. He is widely
regarded as one of the most distinguished tax judges in Canadian history.
In a tribute to him upon his retirement we compared the generally pragmatic approach he took in resolving tax cases with the more formalistic
approach taken by the Supreme Court justices.14 We noted that while the
Supreme Court justices relied on a formalistic approach and appeared to
think they could resolve complicated tax cases simply by ascribing plain
meanings to words, Bowman C.J.‟s approach was more thoughtful and
appropriate:
He recognized that pragmatic adjudication is unavoidable and that
deciding cases involves problem-solving skills of the highest order. He
did not purport to deduce answers to complex cases based on the
supposed plain meaning of words or phrases. He stated goals, weighed
consequences, and chose appropriate results based on notions of policy,
common sense, professional values, and sensitivity to relevant tax
principles … . He always tried hard to reach the best results as he
understood them.15

Obviously, the justices did not read our earlier article, or if they did they
were not persuaded by it or by what we regarded as the genius of the approach to statutory interpretation generally taken by Bowman C.J.
In 2012 the Supreme Court only heard a handful of tax cases. And as
the following four case summaries illustrate, the Court still holds
doggedly to a formalistic approach. They have refused to take seriously
the purposes of the provisions they are interpreting, the consequences
of their decisions in terms of tax principles, or the most sensible
and appropriate result among the alternative interpretations that were
open to them.
In Canada v. Craig,16 the Supreme Court reached a result that
effectively read a long-standing section out of the Act, even though the
section reflects both sound tax policy principles and important tax
expenditure considerations. Moreover, they did it by overruling a
judgment that a unanimous Supreme Court panel had handed down
over 35 years earlier — a judgment that made sense out of the
provision, had been administered appropriately by the CRA over the
14
Neil Brooks & Kim Brooks, “Going for the Jugular: Justice Bowman‟s Approach to the
Craft of Judging” (2010) 58 Can. Tax J. 5.
15
Id., at 27.
16
[2012] S.C.J. No. 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Craig”].
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subsequent years, and was sanctioned in various ways by the Executive
(and by Parliament, in that there was never any parliamentary
suggestion over the past 35 years that the earlier case had misconstrued
the meaning of the provision). The Supreme Court reached this
perverse result in the case (nullifying an important statutory provision)
simply on the grounds that the earlier Supreme Court panel had not
followed the plain meaning of the words in the section. Since this case
so clearly reflects the staggering failure of the Court‟s formalism, we
discuss it in some detail.
Fundy Settlement v. Canada17 presented the Court with the need to
formulate a test to determine the residency of trusts for tax purposes.
Instead of assuming the role of pragmatic tax policy analysts and
formulating a residency test that would preserve the purpose that
residency requirements serve in an income tax system by, for example,
making tax avoidance more difficult, the Court resolved the issue
formally by resorting to an argument by analogy with corporations.
In Canada v. GlaxoSmithKline Inc.,18 the Court dealt with a case in
which Rip A.C.J. of the Tax Court of Canada (as he then was), after an
exhaustive review of the evidence, held a multinational to have engaged
in egregious tax avoidance through the manipulation of transfer prices. In
sending the matter back to the trial court for a redetermination of the reasonableness of the taxpayer‟s transfer prices, the Court imposed a test of
reasonableness that will make it even easier for multinationals to manipulate their transfer prices to avoid tax.
Calgary (City) v. Canada19 does not illustrate the Court‟s formalism
in approaching tax cases since the case did not raise any interpretive issue. It involved the application of reasonably well-understood
consumption tax concepts under the Goods and Services Tax (“GST”).
The Supreme Court did not significantly advance the prevailing understanding of how these concepts should be applied, but at least it did not
further confuse the issues. One wonders why they granted leave to appeal
in the case.

17
18
19

[2012] S.C.J. No. 14, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 520 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fundy”].
[2012] S.C.J. No. 52, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “GlaxoSmithKline”].
[2012] S.C.J. No. 20, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 689 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Calgary”]
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II. CANADA V. CRAIG: A FAILURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
This case raises a specific but nevertheless significant tax policy issue. But, more importantly, this case raises the critical matter of how the
Supreme Court does and should approach issues of statutory interpretation. Moreover, it provides a fascinating window into how the lower
courts deal with Supreme Court decisions that make them uneasy.
1. The Issue
The specific tax issue in the case relates to the circumstances under
which a taxpayer can offset losses incurred in a farming business against
income earned from a completely different source of income, such as a law
practice. Normally, since the whole point of an income tax is to tax
taxpayers on their annual net income (as a reflection of their ability to pay),
losses from any source of income should be allowed to be, and normally
can be, offset against gains from any other source of income. However, a
somewhat notorious provision in the Act — section 31 (commonly referred
to as the “restricted farm loss rule”, but most tax lawyers would be familiar
with the section number) — limits the deductibility of farming losses
against other income in certain circumstances.
Basically, section 31 restricts the deduction of farm losses against income from another source unless the taxpayer falls within one of two
exceptions: (1) farming is the taxpayer‟s chief source of income (the
chief source exception); or (2) a combination of farming and some other
source of income is the taxpayer‟s chief source of income (the combination exception). To appreciate the interpretive issue, the precise wording
of section 31 is important: “Where a taxpayer‟s chief source of income
for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and
some other source of income … [then the taxpayer‟s loss] if any, for the
year from all farming businesses carried on by the taxpayer shall be
deemed to be … [no more than $8,750].”20
Clearly, the section restricts the amount that a taxpayer with a farming loss can deduct from other sources of income in some circumstances.
20
The restricted farm loss rule limits the deduction of farm losses to a maximum of $8,750
annually: $2,500 plus half of the next $12,500. Farm losses in excess of that limited amount can be
carried back three years and forward for 20 years to be claimed against farming income (supra, note 1,
s. 111(1)(c)). The Conservative government proposed to increase the limit to $17,500 in their 2013
budget: Restricted Farm Losses, online: Canada Revenue Agency <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/
gncy/bdgt/2013/qa09-eng.html>.
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But what precisely is the effect of the section? Over the past 60 years this
question has been litigated often. The issue arises frequently since everyone who operates a farm and also has some other source of income is
potentially affected by the section. The facts in Craig raise one of the
trickier interpretive problems posed by the section.
In Craig, the taxpayer carried on a successful law practice and at the
same time operated a horse farm in which he frequently realized large
losses. In 2000 and 2001, the two years for which he was reassessed, he
reported earnings from his law practice of $770,423 and $646,600 respectively. In those two years, he reported losses from his horse farm of
$222,642 and $205,655 respectively. In both years, he deducted the farm
losses from his law practice earnings. The CRA invoked section 31 and
reassessed, limiting the farm losses the taxpayer could deduct from his
law practice earnings to $8,750 each year.
In support of the unlimited offset of his farming losses, the taxpayer
argued that section 31 posits two tests for determining whether the deductibility of farm losses should be restricted: it applies if a taxpayer‟s
“chief source of income” is neither (1) “farming” nor (2) “a combination
of farming and some other source of income”. He conceded that his chief
source of income was not farming but argued that it was a combination
of farming and a law practice, and therefore under the latter combination
test his farm losses should not be restricted. The interpretive issue in the
case is thus a simple one: what does the phrase as used in the section, “a
combination of farming and some other source of income”, mean? The
problem is that to give this phrase almost any meaning makes it hard to
make sense out of the section. Before looking at how the Supreme Court
dealt with this issue in Craig, a bit of judicial history provides some important context.
The section in its modern form was enacted in 1952. For the next
25 years the predecessors to the Tax Court of Canada struggled with its
interpretation.
As a slight digression, one interpretive problem the courts struggled
with was the meaning of the phrase, “a taxpayer‟s chief source of income
for a taxation year”. If this phrase is given its common usage the whole
section becomes nonsense. Again, the section provides, “[w]here a taxpayer‟s chief source of income for a taxation year is … farming … the
taxpayer‟s loss, if any, for the year from all farming business carried on
by the taxpayer shall be deemed to be [not more than $8,750].” But how
can a taxpayer‟s “chief source of income for a taxation year” be one in
which he or she incurred a loss? As a matter of ordinary usage it would
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be odd if someone who had two businesses, one in which they incurred a
profit, and one in which they incurred a loss, reported that the business in
which they incurred a loss was their chief source of income for that year
(it might be said to be their chief source of income over a longer period
but the section refers to the taxpayer‟s chief source of income for the taxation year). In ordinary usage we do not often equate a loss with a source
of income, let alone a chief source of income. In the Act, the concept of
income is generally used to refer to a positive amount.
A number of cases did indeed hold that a business in which a
taxpayer realized a loss could never be his or her chief source of income,
and thus essentially restricted the deduction of all farm losses. However,
other cases solved this problem by giving a meaning to the term “chief
source of income” that made sense out of the provision. They held that a
taxpayer‟s chief source of income in a year did not actually require
the taxpayer to realize any income from that source in that year. The
taxpayer‟s “chief source of income” was the source of income in which
they had invested most of their capital, devoted most of their time, and
had an expectation of long-term profits, basically the source of income
that the taxpayer would regard as his or her major occupation over a
longer period of time.21 Hence, to take an easy case, if a taxpayer had
lived on a farm all of his life, had farm expertise, operated the farm as a
business, had substantial investments in the farm and devoted most of his
time to operating the farm, the farm would be his chief source of income
in a year even if he had realized a loss on the farm and had another parttime construction or other job with income that he could use to offset the
farm loss.
It bears noting that the Supreme Court accepted this meaning of
“chief source of income” in Craig even though in interpreting the phrase,
“a combination of farming and some other source of income”, it refused
to look beyond what it regarded as the plain meaning of the words.
As mentioned, the interpretive issue in Craig was the meaning of the
phrase, “a combination of farming and some other source of income”.
There are three obvious ways the phrase might be interpreted. First, it
might be read as meaning that, in arriving at a taxpayer‟s chief source of
income, the farming income (or loss) can be combined with any other

21
See Moldowan v. Canada, [1977] S.C.J. No. 55, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 480, at 485 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Moldowan”]: “On a literal reading of the section, no taxpayer could ever claim more
than the maximum $5,000 deduction which the section contemplates; the only way in which the
section can have meaning is to place emphasis on the words „source of income.‟”
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source of income the taxpayer might have. Thus, if the taxpayer is both
farming and practising law, his or her chief source of income is a
combination of these two sources. The obvious difficulty with this
interpretation is that it appears to make nonsense out of the section itself.
In almost every case taxpayers would be able to deduct their farming
losses against their other income. Second, the phrase might be read as
meaning that the source of income that is combined with farming has to
be related to farming in some way; that is to say, the two sources have to
be connected. The difficulty with this interpretation is that there are no
specific words in the phrase suggesting that the two sources of income
have to be connected. Third, the phrase could essentially be ignored and
hence, unless a taxpayer‟s chief source of income is farming, the farm
loss would be restricted under the provision. This interpretation makes
sense out of the provision but the difficulty with this interpretation is that
the courts are reluctant not to give a meaning to every word and phrase
used in a statutory provision.
2. Prior Judicial History: Moldowan v. Canada
From the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s, cases in the tax administrative tribunals and trial courts had taken each of these three approaches;
however, the CRA was administering the section on the basis that unless
farming was the taxpayer‟s chief source of income, his or her farming
losses were restricted (the third possible interpretation above). In 1973,
the meaning of this phrase was raised in a case that was eventually appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, Moldowan v. Canada.22 In that
case, the taxpayer operated a horse racing business in which he incurred
large losses in most years. He offset these losses against income from
another business. The Minister allowed only the restricted deduction under section 31. The taxpayer‟s appeals to the Tax Review Board23 and
then the Trial Division of the Federal Court24 were both dismissed without any discussion of the combination test but simply on the grounds that
farming was not the taxpayer‟s chief source of income.

22

Id.
Moldowan v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (1973), 73 D.T.C. 228, [1973]
C.T.C. 2294 (T.R.B.).
24
Moldowan v. Canada (1974), 74 D.T.C. 6496, [1974] C.T.C. 638 (F.C.T.D.).
23
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The Federal Court of Appeal25 upheld the decision of the Trial
Division, but each of the three judges gave separate reasons and one
dissented. Justice Pratte dealt directly with the meaning of the phrase,
“combination of farming and some other source of income”. He said that
he did not share the view that a taxpayer‟s chief source of income could be
a combination of farming and some other source even if there was no
connection of any sort between the farming activities and other sources of
income. In his opinion, “combination” meant more than “addition”, and it
implied “a certain degree of association or integration”.26 Only if two
sources of income were in some way integrated or interconnected could it
be said that their combination constituted one source of income. Moreover,
if “combination” meant nothing more than “addition”, section 13 (now
section 31) would be devoid of any effect, “since the taxpayer engaged in
the business of farming … could always claim (by adding „farming‟ to his
most important source of income) his chief source of income to be a
„combination of farming and some other source of income‟”.27
In his dissent, Urie J. took issue with this view, stating that to imply
that there must be a connection between things which are combined
would require that additional words be read into the section, “and would
strain the natural meaning to be given to a word”.28 He went on to say that
if a person carrying on the business of farming had only one other source
of income he was obviously outside the purview of subsection 13(1).29
Thus, on Urie J.‟s reading, the section applied only if the taxpayer had
more than two sources of income, and farming could not be combined
with one of them to constitute his chief source of income. While concentrating on the apparent plain meaning of the words, Urie J. appears
unaware of what a strange result he reached. What could be the possible
justification for restricting a taxpayer‟s farm losses if they have three
sources of income, but not if they only have two? Arguably, this is the
effective result of the Supreme Court‟s decision in Craig.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the taxpayer‟s appeal in a
relatively short unanimous judgment written by Dickson J. It is unclear
from his judgment exactly how the combination test should be applied.
He stated that in applying the test, the two sources of income did not

25
26
27
28
29

Moldowan v. Canada, [1975] F.C.J. No. 138, 75 D.T.C. 5216 (F.C.A.).
Id., at para. 10 (F.C.J.).
Id., at para. 11.
Id., at para. 19.
Id., at para. 33.
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have to be connected. But he also stated that, “[I]t is clear that „combination‟ in s. 13 cannot mean simple addition of two sources of income for
any taxpayer. That would lead to the result that a taxpayer could combine
his farming loss with his most important other source of income, thereby
constituting his chief source. … Such a construction would mean that the
limitation of the section would never apply … .”30 He concluded that
section 31 applies to “the taxpayer who does not look to farming … for
his livelihood but carries on farming as a sideline business”.31 Although
Dickson J.‟s judgment might be capable of a different reading, most
commentators and judges accepted that it meant that farming had to be
the taxpayer‟s chief source of income in order to avoid the restriction of
section 31. His judgment appeared to give no meaning to the combination test.
3. Prior Judicial History: Gunn v. Canada
Following Moldowan, the CRA continued to apply the section 31 restriction on the deductibility of farming losses to every taxpayer whose
chief source of income was not farming. Of course, particularly highincome businesspeople and professionals who operated farms, often
horse racing operations, as a sideline business or part-time, continued to
complain about the application of the section to them. Also, commentators and some judges noted that the Supreme Court‟s interpretation
appeared to give no meaning to the combination test.
In 2006, after a number of failed taxpayer efforts to work around
Moldowan, a part-time farmer found a sympathetic Federal Court of
Appeal panel. Douglas G. Gunn was a lawyer in Southwestern Ontario
who maintained a mixed farm operation that included cattle, grains and
tobacco. He had invested a considerable sum in the farming operation and
spent a lot of time working on it, although not as much time as he did at
his law practice. Over the years in question (1997-1999) he reported
income from his law practice of between $205,000 and $309,000 and farm
losses ranging from $54,000 to $159,000. The CRA restricted the
deductibility of the farm losses under section 31. In the Tax Court of
Canada, Bowie J. applied Moldowan and held that the taxpayer‟s “farming
was, in the words of Dickson J., „a sideline business‟”.32
30
31
32

Moldowan, supra, note 21, at 487 (S.C.R.).
Id.
Gunn v. Canada, [2005] T.C.J. No. 309, [2005] 4 C.T.C. 2032 (T.C.C.).
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The taxpayer appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal which, in a
lengthy, thorough and bold judgment, overturned the Tax Court and basically refused to follow Moldowan.33 Since the Supreme Court agreed
with the Federal Court of Appeal‟s holding, although it held that the Federal Court was wrong in not following Moldowan, we will set out the
Federal Court‟s reasoning in some detail. Also, Sharlow J.A.‟s thorough
analysis of the factors to be considered in interpreting a tax provision
should be contrasted with the Supreme Court‟s sole reliance on the plain
meaning of the words. Although Sharlow J.A. attempted to deal seriously
with the issues raised, unfortunately she reached the wrong result.
She was misled (likely by counsel) about the purpose of the section, its
history and the effect of her decision. Moreover, she was constrained by
the Supreme Court‟s injunctions against lawmaking.
Writing for a unanimous court, Sharlow J.A. begins her judgment by
citing the Supreme Court‟s judgment in Trustco34 and stating that, “[T]he
interpretation of section 31 requires a textual, contextual and purposive
analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Income Tax Act as
a whole, and that achieves consistency, predictability and fairness so that
taxpayers may manage their affairs intelligently”. In searching for the
meaning of the phrase, “a combination of farming and some other source
of income”, Sharlow J.A. examines each factor set out by the Supreme
Court in Trustco. First, she examines the statutory context, but finds no
assistance;35 she next reviews the legislative history of section 31, but
again finds no assistance in that history to give meaning to the phrase;36
and she then turns to the purpose of section 31 for assistance but concludes, “I have been able to find nothing that provides a satisfactory
explanation for the existence of section 31.”37
She then turns to the Supreme Court‟s judgment in Moldowan.
Highlighting the Supreme Court‟s insistence on the desirability of
consistency, predictability and fairness in interpreting the Act, she notes
that even after Moldowan, the application of the section gave rise
to considerable uncertainty. As evidence, she reviewed the five cases
that the Federal Court of Appeal had heard over the previous eight years.38
33

Gunn v. Canada, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1256, [2007] 3 F.C.R. 57 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter

“Gunn”].
34
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Supra, note 9.
Gunn, supra, note 33, at paras. 15-26 (F.C.J.).
Id., at paras. 27-44.
Id., at paras. 45-54.
Id., at paras. 62-69.
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She notes that several commentators and judges had criticized Moldowan
on the grounds that although Dickson J. held that section 31 “should
apply to a person for whom farming is a „sideline‟ business or a
„subordinate‟ source of income … section 31 does not use the words
„sideline‟ or „subordinate‟, or any analogous term”.39 Finally, she refers to
a number of recent Supreme Court cases where the Court had warned
“against the development of judge-made rules in tax matters”, and in
particular against reading “unlegislated gloss” into a section that has a
“discernable literal meaning”.40 She concludes that the kind of judicial
intervention that Dickson J. had undertaken in Moldowan was
inconsistent with this more recent approach to statutory interpretation
taken by the Supreme Court.
Although adamant that some meaning should be given to the combination test, she was not entirely clear what it should be. She appears to
suggest that in order for farming to be combined with some other source
of income it is not necessary that farming be the taxpayer‟s chief source
of income (since that is the first test), only that the farming business be a
substantial undertaking. A lengthy quote seems necessary to provide a
sense of her holding:
In my view, the combination question should be interpreted to require
only an examination of the cumulative effect of the aggregate of the
capital invested in farming and a second source of income, the aggregate
of the income derived from farming and a second source of income, and
the aggregate of the time spent on farming and on the second source of
income, considered in the light of the taxpayer‟s ordinary mode of living,
farming history, and future intentions and expectations. This would avoid
the judge-made test that requires farming to be the predominant element
in the combination of farming with the second source of income, which
in my view is a test that cannot stand with subsequent jurisprudence. It
would result in a positive answer to the combination question if, for
example, the taxpayer has invested significant capital in a farming
enterprise, the taxpayer spends virtually all of his or her working time on
a combination of farming and the other principal income earning activity,
and the taxpayer‟s day to day activities are a combination of farming and
the other income earning activity, in which the time spent in each is
significant.41

39
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Id., at para. 70.
Id., at paras. 74-77.
Id., at para. 83.
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This definition is essentially the meaning of the combination test that the
Supreme Court adopts. Justice Sharlow does not state explicitly that she
is refusing to follow Moldowan, but that is the thrust of her judgment.42
Following Gunn, the Tax Court decisions were in disarray. Some Tax
Court judges applied Gunn, while others continued to follow Moldowan.
Clearly, a resolution by the Supreme Court was called for.
4. Lower Court Decisions
Three years after Gunn was decided by the Federal Court of Appeal,
Mr. Craig brought his case to the Tax Court. It was a typical farm loss
case involving a relatively well-to-do taxpayer attempting to offset large
losses from a horse racing business against his professional income, and
to which the CRA had consistently applied the restriction in section 31.
In the Tax Court, Mr. Craig relied heavily on the decision in Gunn to
support his position that his horse racing operation, in combination with
his law practice, was his chief source of income for the relevant years.
The Crown, on the one hand, argued that Mr. Craig‟s chief source of income was neither farming nor a combination of farming and some other
source, because farming was not his predominant source of income as
required by Moldowan. The Crown also argued that the Tax Court of
Canada should feel itself bound by the Moldowan decision rather than
following the Gunn decision. The taxpayer, on the other hand, urged the
Tax Court judge, Hershfield J., not to follow Moldowan on the grounds
that interpreting the combination test as requiring the taxpayer‟s other
source of income (his law practice in this case) to be subordinate to his
farming income rendered the test superfluous. He also argued that the
principles of statutory construction on which Moldowan was decided
were no longer acceptable since the Supreme Court in that case was inappropriately making law. Further, he noted that Moldowan had attracted
considerable criticism.43
In deciding in favour of the taxpayer, Hershfield J. applied the combination test articulated in Gunn and held that even if farming was a
sideline or subordinate business, section 31 would not apply if farming
was a substantial business compared to the taxpayer‟s chief source of
income. Here is how Hershfield J. put it: “Contrary to Moldowan, Gunn
42
To hedge her holding, Sharlow J.A. goes on to conclude that in any event, on the facts of
the case, she would not find that Mr. Gunn‟s farming activities were a mere sideline (id., at para. 92).
43
Craig v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 505, 2009 TCC 617, at paras. 23-24 (T.C.C.).
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suggests that the activity propping up the farming income need not be
subordinate to farming but rather it suggests that the farming activity,
relative to the other source [of income], must make a relevant or meaningful contribution to the aggregation formula assessed by using the
Moldowan criteria.”44 He did not expressly refuse to follow Moldowan
but instead he reasoned that, “Gunn simply puts the Moldowan analysis
back on track as a workable construction of section 31 — one that does
not render it sterile while paying heed to the language of the section”.45
In not applying the section 31 restriction, he found the facts in Craig to
be indistinguishable from the facts in Gunn.
The Minister appealed primarily on the grounds that the trial judge
had erred in applying the interpretation of the combination test set out in
Gunn as opposed to the one set out in Moldowan. The Federal Court of
Appeal dismissed the Minister‟s appeal, reasoning that it was bound by
its previous decision in Gunn.46
5. Supreme Court
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Rothstein J. first held
that both the Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal erred in not following the combination test as set out in Moldowan. He stated that those
courts might have given reasons as to why Moldowan was problematic,
but they should have followed it rather than “purporting to overrule it”.47
He then addressed directly the question of whether the Supreme
Court should overrule its prior decision in Moldowan. He noted a number
of cases where the Supreme Court had overruled one of its prior decisions, but cautioned that overruling a prior case should only be done
where there were “compelling reasons that the precedent was wrongly
decided”.48 He then gave three reasons that Moldowan should be overruled: (1) the effect of the decision was to “read the combination test out
of s. 31(1)”; (2) “there has been significant judicial, academic and other
criticism of Moldowan”; and (3) “since Moldowan, this Court has held
on a number of occasions that unexpressed legislative intention under the
guise of purposive interpretation is to be avoided … . A judge-made rule

44
45
46
47
48

Id., at para. 57.
Id., at para. 61.
Canada v. Craig, [2011] F.C.J. No. 435, [2011] 2 F.C.R. 436 (F.C.A.).
Craig, supra, note 16, at para. 21.
Id., at para. 25.
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that reads one of the exceptions out of the provision is not consistent
with the words used by Parliament.”49
Agreeing that the combination test should not be given an interpretation
that renders the section meaningless, Rothstein J. cites Sharlow J.A.‟s
judgment in Gunn, and other authorities, as support for the proposition that
the test “does not contemplate a simple aggregation of two sources of
income, but requires a wider inquiry into the amount of capital, time, effort,
commitment and general emphasis on the part of the taxpayer with respect
to the sources of income”.50 Thus, although farming does not need to be the
predominant source of income in applying the combination test, the taxpayer
must “devote significant time and resources to the farming business”51 in
order for the losses to be combined with another source of income under the
combination test. He concluded by noting that Hershfield J. had considered
the relevant factors at the trial level and stated that there was no basis for
disturbing his finding of fact that, under this interpretation, the combination
test was satisfied and hence the section 31 loss restriction did not apply.
The Supreme Court‟s interpretation of section 31 ignores the purpose
of the provision, leads to an untenable policy result, is based on a misreading of the history of the section, and is contrary to the Court‟s stated
approach to statutory interpretation in that it requires words to be read
into the section — that is, it requires lawmaking. This interpretation
starkly illustrates the Court‟s fixation on the text of a tax provision to the
exclusion of the consequences.
6. Purpose for Restricting the Deduction of Farm Losses
As an indication of the formality of the Supreme Court‟s approach to
statutory interpretation in Craig, not once in the judgment did Rothstein J.
allude to the possible purpose of section 31, the potential consequences
of his decision, or the end goal of his interpretation in terms of tax principles. He purported to be able to solve the problem with which the Court
was confronted simply by reading the section, divorced from its context.
Aside from anything else, this seems contrary to the Court‟s oft-stated
proposition that it takes a textual, contextual and purposive analysis in
interpreting legislation.
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Id., at paras. 28-30.
Id., at para. 37.
Id., at para. 41.
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Quite astonishingly, judges in a line of cases interpreting section 31,
including Gunn and the lower court judges in Craig, professed to be unaware of the policy reasons for section 31. Based on this, perhaps
Rothstein J. thought it would be futile to search for or speculate about the
purpose of the section; however, in fact, section 31 plays two important
(and if we may say so, quite obvious) roles in the tax system. First, it and
sections like it play an important role in increasing the equity of the
technical tax system by limiting the deductibility of personal expenses.
Second, section 31 serves a crucial role in implementing the policy goals
of the tax expenditures for farming in the Act by targeting those tax expenditures primarily on full-time farmers. In light of these important
policy objectives, it is little wonder that in the first budget tabled after
Craig, the federal government announced it was amending section 31 to
override the holding in Craig and to reinstate the combination test as interpreted in Moldowan.52
Since they seem to be so misunderstood, we elaborate slightly on each
of these purposes of section 31. The income tax derives its moral
legitimacy from the fact that it taxes two people who consume personal
goods and services of equivalent value (and who have the same savings)
the same. Consequently, one of the most fundamental principles
underlying an equitable tax system is that businesspeople should not be
able to deduct an expense — even if incurred in order to earn a profit — to
the extent that they derive a personal benefit from it. That is why, for
example, under the Act, the cost of yachts and memberships in private
clubs are not deductible, even though a taxpayer might incur those costs to
entertain clients and earn income.53 Even if incurred in a business context,
it is assumed that the personal benefit of these expenses equals their cost.
Similarly, only 50 per cent of the cost of business meals and entertainment
is deductible.54 Although the personal benefits derived from these
expenses, even if incurred in a business context, might not equal their cost,
they are assumed to be substantial, as reflected in the disallowance of

52
See Annex 2: Tax Measures — Supplementary Information and Notices of Ways and Means
Motions, in Canada, Department of Finance, Canadian Federal Budget 2013 (March 21, 2013), at 362,
online: <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2013/doc/plan/budget2013-eng.pdf>: “The Moldowan decision is
consistent with the purpose of the chief source of income test, which is to ensure that taxpayers for whom
farming is not the principal occupation are limited in their ability to deduct farm losses from their non-farm
income. … Budget 2013 proposes to amend [section 31] … to codify the chief source of income test as
interpreted in Moldowan.”
53
Income Tax Act, supra, note 1, s. 18(1)(l).
54
Id., s. 67.1.
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one-half the expense. Although many other tax policy doctrines could be
used to illustrate this point, just one more example will suffice. The
expenses of maintaining a home workplace used in a business can only be
deducted from income from that business.55 The reason for this is that it is
assumed that even though home office expenses are incurred to earn
income, these expenses are likely to contain a personal element.
Many individuals who pursue farming as a part-time business derive
enormous personal satisfaction from the activity even though they might
expect to realize a profit at some point (so they are not hobby farmers).
These might be people who work in the city but who operate small farms
because they enjoy the rural lifestyle, or who enjoy being around and
raising animals, or who enjoy breeding or raising racing horses. Indeed,
most of the litigated section 31 cases involve horse farms. Being involved in horse racing seems to hold a special fascination for many
wealthy individuals. It enables them to admire the grace and beauty of
well-trained horses and to engage legitimately in the thrill of gambling
and the excitement of having a horse in the race (so to speak). As an indication of the personal enjoyment involved in horse racing, many
people spend huge amounts to follow the sport solely as a hobby. It is,
after all, the Sport of Kings. Hence, the restriction on the deductibility of
losses for part-time farmers is an indirect way of limiting the personal
expenses that these taxpayers might otherwise deduct.
The section limits the deductibility of the personal element of
business expenses relating to part-time farming but, in addition, the
section operates to limit the deductibility of farm expenses incurred
solely for a personal purpose. It is often difficult to distinguish between
hobby farmers and business farmers. By limiting the deductibility of
expenses, section 31 reduces some of the cost of making a mistake along
this margin by treating a hobby farmer as carrying on a business. Thus
the section takes some pressure off the CRA to classify farmers as
hobbyists.56
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Id., s. 18(12)(b).
See Michael Wilson, Tax Issues in Agriculture: A Discussion Paper (Ottawa: Department
of Finance, 1985) at 30: “[T]he restricted loss provision creates a middle ground between full-time
farmers and those farming without any expectation of profit. As it is not always easy to determine
the expectation of profit, the middle ground minimizes the need for a rigid enforcement of this test
and the resulting potential disputes between Revenue Canada and taxpayers, especially where the
loss amounts are small.”
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The other reason that farm tax losses are restricted in section 31 follows from the fact that the Act is filled with tax concessions for farmers.
The Department of Finance lists 15 tax concessions for farmers in its
annual tax expenditure account.57 For example, farmers are allowed to
report their income on a cash basis and to deduct as a current expense
land improvement expenses.58 Moreover, tax concessions that in theory
apply to all businesses are often of particular significance to farmers,
such as the ability to deduct the carrying charges on farm land currently,
even though a good deal of the corresponding income will be deferred
and taxed as a capital gain when realized. Hence, an important purpose
of section 31 is to target the implicit tax spending provisions in the Act
on full-time farmers.59 Indeed, without section 31, these tax concessions
would in most cases have the perverse effect of being more valuable to
part-time farmers with high off-farm income than to full-time farmers
who might have no other income to offset them against, or whose income
might be taxed at lower marginal rates than that of high-income part-time
farmers.60 Among other things, not attempting to target these concessions
on full-time farmers would substantially increase their cost and would
provide part-time farmers with an unfair competitive advantage over fulltime farmers.
The purposes of section 31 should be evident to anyone familiar with
tax policy and tax expenditure analysis. But more significantly, the Department of Finance clearly set them out in a discussion paper it released
in 1985 on tax issues in agriculture.61 That document contains a 20-page
discussion of section 31 and possible reforms to it. It is shocking that this
document was not referred to in Gunn or Craig.
Moreover, going back further, the Recommendations of the Royal
Commission on Taxation (also known as the “Carter Report”), which

57
Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2012 (Ottawa:
Department of Finance, 2013), at 16.
58
For a description of many of the special tax concessions for farmers and a critical
appraisal, see Alex MacNevin, “Agricultural Taxation in Canada: An Overview and Assessment”
(1998) 46:2 Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 93, at 114: “There is always a natural bias
among elected officials and the general public to try to make things easier for farmers through
preferential tax rules. However such an approach is often doomed to failure in the long run.”
59
Among other indications, this purpose of s. 31 might be inferred from its place in the Act.
Section 28 allows farmers to report their income on a cash basis; s. 30 allows for the current
deduction of all expenses of improving land for farming. Section 31 then attempts to target these
concessions on full-time farmers.
60
Supra, note 56, at 29.
61
Id., at 20-39.
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remains in many cases the best source of analysis relating to the tax policy
choices underlying the Act, contains a clear description of the problem of
both limiting the deductibility of personal expenses of part-time farming
operations and of limiting the tax concessions for farmers to full-time
farmers.62 After stating the issues that section 31 (then section 13) was
intended to deal with, the Commission ultimately recommended that the
section might be repealed but only because the Commission recommended
it be replaced by a general provision designed to prohibit the deduction
from other income of losses incurred by any business that consistently
(over three loss years) operated at a loss. They also recommended that
most of the special concessions for farmers be repealed, including the
ability to report their income on a cash instead of an accrual basis (“except
in the case of an individual whose principal source of income is farming
and whose gross revenue from farming is less than a specified sum, say,
$10,000”).63
In the Tax Reform Act of 1972,64 the government did not adopt the
Commission‟s recommendation to enact a general loss restriction
provision or to abolish cash accounting for farmers; therefore, it retained
the rules restricting the deduction of losses for part-time farmers in
section 31 of the reformed legislation. Following the Carter Report, the
Government‟s White Paper on Tax Reform recommended that the
farming loss restriction rules be retained,65 and both the Senate66 and

62
Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Recommendations of the Royal Commission on
Taxation (Carter Commission), 1967, vol. 4 (Don Mills, ON: CCH Canadian Ltd., 1967), at 440
[hereinafter “Recommendations of the Royal Commission”].
63
See Recommendations of the Royal Commission, id., at 136. With respect to the cash
basis of accounting the Commission noted that:
It is true that the advantage under the present tax system [of cash basis accounting]
is only a deferment of tax in that the cost would ultimately be allowed as a deduction;
however, the deferment is equivalent, in relative terms, to an interest-free, unsecured
loan, which could be of material amount, and is not granted to businesses generally.
The cash basis of computing income has also created an extra incentive for wealthy individuals to establish a farm as a secondary endeavour, because losses reported for the
early years of operation would be artificially high due to the write-off of the costs of
building up inventories and other assets.
64
R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 (as am.).
65
Edgar J. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen‟s Printer,
1969) at para. 5.53 (“Because this provision [section 13] is intended to prohibit the deduction of
personal expenses from taxable income, it would remain in the Act under the new system.”).
66
Canada, Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Report on The
White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen‟s Printer, 1970) at 73.
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House of Commons67 committees that held extensive public hearings on
the White Paper proposals concurred in that recommendation. In light of
this relatively recent history of section 31, and an affirmation of its
importance by the Executive, two parliamentary committees, and
Parliament itself, it is somewhat surprising that judges and some
commentators would wonder about its significance, as if it were an
overlooked anomaly in the tax system.
7. History of the Restriction of the Deduction of Farm Losses
Parliament had been concerned about the ability of part-time farmers
to offset their farm losses from other income almost from the inception
of the income tax, and it has remained a concern throughout the history
of the Act. In the original 1917 Income War Tax Act,68 all income was
netted. There was no restriction on the deductibility of losses from one
source of income from gains on another. However, only two years later, a
provision was introduced, paragraph 3(f), to provide that, “deficits or
losses sustained in transactions entered into for profit but not connected
with the chief business, trade, profession or occupation of the taxpayer
shall not be deducted from the income derived from the chief business,
trade, profession or occupation of the taxpayer in determining his taxable
income”.69 Although the provision is worded generally, it appears
from statements in the House of Commons by the Minister of Finance,
Sir Thomas White, that it was targeted primarily at part-time farmers:
Not long ago it was brought to my attention that a man who had a large
income took it into his head that he could become a successful farmer.
They say when a man does fancy farming he is an “agriculturist”, as
distinguished [from] a “farmer” who does real farming and makes
money. The “agriculturist” nearly always loses money, and we do not
propose to let him set up any loss in this enterprise. We will assess him
on his income. We do not desire to discourage him from going into

67

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic
Affairs, Eighteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs
Respecting the White Paper on Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen‟s Printer, 1970) at paras. 5.48-5.53.
68
Income War Tax Act, 1917, S.C. 1917, c. 28.
69
This was added as s. 3(1)(f) to the 1917 Act, id., by S.C. 1919, c. 55, s. 2(2), as amended
by S.C. 1920, c. 49, s. 2 and S.C. 1923, c. 52, s. 1 (the language was somewhat simplified in 1923
and again in 1927).
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farming, but do not think he should set up such losses against a
substantial income he derives in the city.70

The next year, a subsection was added providing the Minister with
the power to determine “what deficits or losses sustained in transactions
entered into for profit are connected with the chief business, trade, profession or occupation of the taxpayer”, and that the Minister‟s decision
on this question would be “final and conclusive”.71 Again, in introducing
this amendment, the then Minister of Finance, Sir Henry Drayton, observed that, “[I]n all our large cities, particularly in Toronto, there are a
lot of agriculturists, if I may use that word, as distinguished from farmers. I refer to men who make their money in the city, but who have farms
just outside the city in connection with they lose money”.72
In 1923, the provision was reworded to read, “[I]n any case the income
of a taxpayer shall be deemed to be not less than the income derived from
his chief position, occupation, trade, business or calling”,73 and in the
consolidation of the federal statutes in 1927, paragraph 3(f) became section
10. In part, presumably because the Minister‟s determination of a
taxpayer‟s chief occupation was “final and conclusive”, there were no
cases under this provision.
In 1948, the Income War Tax Act underwent a major redrafting and
was renamed simply the Income Tax Act.74 Section 10 of the Income War
Tax Act was retained and with slight redrafting became subsections 13(1)
and 13(2). Most notably, the phrase “chief position, occupation, trade,
business or calling” was changed to “chief source of income”. This drafting change was made not to change the meaning of the provision, but
was made to restrict the deduction of losses on part-time businesses from
investment income if that was the taxpayer‟s chief source of income.
In 1951, a subsection that singled out farmers and that was almost
identical in its wording to the present section 31 was added to section 13
and made retroactive to 1949.75 The new provision provided that, where
a taxpayer‟s “chief source of income for a taxation year is neither farming nor a combination of farming and some other source of income”, the
“permissible farming loss deduction from all other sources of income
70

House of Commons Debates, 13th Parl., 2d Sess., No. 4 (June 24, 1919), at 3991.
S.C. 1920, c. 49, s. 21.
72
House of Commons Debates, 13th Parl., 4th Sess., No. 144 (June 8, 1920), at 3241.
73
S.C. 1923, c. 52, s. 1 (para. 3(f) was replaced with a rule that deemed the income of a
taxpayer to be not less than the income derived from the taxpayer‟s chief occupation).
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was the lesser of one-half the farming loss for the year or $5,000”. This
provision was added not because of new-found concern for part-time
farmers, but to codify an administrative practice. Apparently, since the
1920s, as an administrative concession, the CRA had allowed part-time
famers to deduct one-half of their farm losses from other secondary
sources of income.76 With the amendments in 1948, the Department of
Revenue stopped extending this administrative concession to part-time
farmers. As a result of lobbying from part-time farmers, in 1951 the government decided to codify a form of limited relief for part-time farmers.77
With this specific provision applying to part-time farming in place in
1952, the general provision prohibiting taxpayers from netting secondary
business losses from their chief source of income was repealed.78 In justifying targeting the provision specifically at farmers, the Minister of
Finance, Hon. Douglas Abbott, stated: “[G]entlemen farmers never make
money from their farms. They always lose money; and they write off that
loss against income from other sources, such as salary or investment income.”79 The provision has remained essentially unchanged since 1953.
Thus, even this brief review of the legislative history of section 31 shows
that Parliament had a strong and ongoing concern over allowing parttime farmers to deduct their losses from other income.
8. Restricting the Deduction of Farm Losses in Other Countries
Finally, in underlining the important tax policy roles played by
section 31, it might be noted that part-time farming is a common lifestyle
choice in many countries. Moreover, many countries provide farmers
with special tax concessions and have some special measures limiting the

76
See Mr. Abbott, Minister of Finance, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parl., 92d Sess.,
No. 5, 1951 (June 13, 1951), at 4054 (in which he speaks of representations made to him to preserve
an administrative practice “going back to the early twenties” of allowing part-time farmers to deduct
one-half of their losses against other income).
77
See Arthur Gilmour, Income Tax Handbook 1952-1953 (Toronto: Richard De Boo, 1952), at
314-15. See also Kerry Harnish, “Sections 3 and 9 of the Income Tax Act: The Source of Income Concept
and the „Reasonable Expectation of Profit‟ Rule” (1999) 37:4 Alta. L. Rev. 850, at 862-64.
78
The general loss restrictions in s. 13(1) and (2) were repealed by S.C. 1952, c. 29, s. 4. See
House of Commons Debates, 22d Parl., 3d. Sess., No. 3, 1956 (May 27, 1952), at 2626: “Mr. Abbott:
The idea of the provision was to limit the deduction which a gentleman farmer may take for income
tax purposes against other income as a result of farm losses. It was felt it was no longer necessary to
have the definition of principal source of income as contained in the original section.”
79
Id. (Another member of the House followed up with: “They make money in the city and
lose it in the country.”)
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deduction of losses of part-time farmers. Often this legislation is
supported by organizations representing full-time farmers who are
concerned with the unfair competition that tax concessions can provide,
particularly to high-income part-time farmers and investors. The 1987
Department of Finance‟s discussion paper, Tax Issues in Agriculture,
reviews some of the expression of these concerns in the U.S. and efforts
made in that country up to the 1986 tax reforms to limit the deductibility
of part-time farm losses.80 A number of the general anti-tax shelter
provisions enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 apply to farm
investments.81 Moreover, the general loss rules in the U.S., under which
it is presumed an activity is engaged in for profit only if profits occur in
any three of five consecutive years (or two of seven consecutive years for
horse operations), is applied primarily to farms and horse operations.82
Australia enacted non-commercial loss rules in 1997 that provide
that losses from so-called non-commercial activities cannot be offset
against other income. Although the rules are complex, they basically
provide that a business loss will be quarantined by the rules unless the
business passes either a size test (based either on gross sales or assets
employed) or a profitability test (the activity has made a profit in three
out of the past five years (including the current year)). Concerned that
the rules were not strict enough in applying to so-called “Pitt Street
farmers”, in 2009 the government considerably tightened the restrictive
loss rules. Basically, if a taxpayer‟s total adjusted income is over
$250,000, no business losses can be offset against other income.83
In 2004, South Africa enacted rules under which “ring-fenced
assessed losses” cannot be offset against other income but must be
carried forward to be deducted against income from the same activities in
which the losses were incurred.84 The rules only apply to high-income
80
Supra, note 56, at 30-34. See also Charles Davenport, “Farm Losses Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1969: Keepin‟ ‟Em Happy Down on the Farm” (1971) 12 B.C.L. Rev. 319.
81
Charles Davenport, “Farm Taxation: Lessons from History” (1988) 37 Drake L. Rev. 183.
82
See U.S., Internal Revenue Service, Market Segment Specialization Program, IRC
Section 183: Farm Hobby Losses with Cattle Operations and Horse Activities (Washington:
Department of the Treasury, 2001).
83
Naturally, the rules are considerably more complex than this short summary suggests.
Among other refinements, taxpayers can apply for an exemption from the rules in limited
circumstances. See Julie Cassidy, “Devil‟s in the Detail: Non-Commercial Business Losses” (2008)
3:2 Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 87; Andrew Smith, The Tax Status of
Hobbies and Other Loss-Making Activities in New Zealand, online: University of Auckland Business
School <http://docs.business.auckland.ac.nz/Doc/59-Andrew-Smith.pdf> [quoted with permission].
84
See South African Revenue Service, Guide on the Ring-Fencing of Assessed Losses
Arising from Certain Trades Conducted by Individuals (May 19, 2005), online: <http://www.sars.
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taxpayers, those whose income exceeds the level at which the maximum
rate of tax applies. They are general rules that apply if the person has
made a loss from the activity in any three of the last five years or if the
activity being carried on by the person is a suspect trade, namely, a set of
listed trades that are often carried on for personal pleasure, including
farming. However, reflecting some of the same concerns evident in the
Canadian restricted farm loss rules, a person is exempt from the rules if
he or she is a full-time farmer.
9. Analysis
This is not a paper on the tax treatment of farm losses — it is a
comment on Craig. Nevertheless, this brief review of policy objectives,
legislative history and analogous provisions in other countries is meant to
illustrate that the problem of restricting the deductibility of losses by
part-time farmers is an issue that has been recognized on numerous occasions by legislative bodies. Section 31 performs important tax policy and
tax expenditure purposes. Yet in Craig, the Supreme Court appeared to
proceed in ignorance of these purposes and history and essentially read
the section out of the Act.
In Craig, the Supreme Court, in interpreting the phrase “combination
of farming and some other source of income”, held that the restrictive
farm loss rules do not apply to part-time farmers as long as their activity
is substantial. This means it likely will not apply to high-income
taxpayers who make substantial investments in farming. Yet, arguably,
that is precisely the kind of person to whom the section should apply.
Taxpayers in the highest marginal tax bracket receive the greatest benefit
from the farm tax concessions. They are also the ones frequently using
country estates as lifestyle choices or running horse breeding and racing
businesses as essentially an expensive hobby. Realistically, the Supreme
Court‟s interpretation means that the section will never apply except
possibly to taxpayers who are engaging in farming activities on a small
scale without a business purpose, and therefore whose losses would be
denied in any event as losses from a hobby.
Moreover, the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the section creates
all of the problems it attributed to Moldowan. First, to the extent that the
gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-IT-G04%20-%20Guide%20on%20Ring%20Fencing%20of%20
Assessed%20Losses%20Arising%20from%20Trades%20Conducted%20by%20Individuals%20-%
20External %20Guide.pdf>.
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courts attempt to determine whether the taxpayer‟s farming activity is
substantial enough to come within the exception the Court fashioned, a
good deal of uncertainty will be created around its application. The test
calls for a much more difficult factual inquiry than that involved in applying the Moldowan test.
Second, and even odder, the Supreme Court in Craig charged the
Court in Moldowan with adding words to the section, namely, that in
applying the combination test the farming activity had to be a “sideline”
business or, put another way, the taxpayer‟s other business had to
“predominate”. And yet in this case they also necessarily inserted words
into the phrase. The phrase simply provides that the taxpayer‟s chief
source of income has to be a “combination of farming and some other
source of income”. There is no suggestion in the phrase about the relative
weight of those activities. It would appear that any farming activity can
be combined with any other source of income. The Supreme Court
reworded the phrase to read something like a “combination of substantial
farming activity and some other source of income”.
Of course, unless words are added, as many commentators and courts
have pointed out, the combination test renders the section itself
meaningless. So the Court‟s choice was to add words or simply to ignore
the combination test. In order for the section to achieve its purposes, the
Court could have added the words suggested in Moldowan and in the
budget documents so that the combination test would read “a combination
of farming and some other source of income that is a subordinate source of
income for the taxpayer”, or they could have simply ignored the phrase.
That is, they could have interpreted the section as if that phrase was not in
it. Of course, the Court is reluctant to ignore words and phrases in a
statutory provision, but in other areas of law they do it regularly,
particularly if they reach a decision that would otherwise lead to an absurd
result. In Craig, the Court‟s choice was clear: either give the section an
interpretation that renders the whole section meaningless (even though the
section implements important tax policy and tax expenditure objectives),
or give it an interpretation that ignores a phrase used in the section.
There is one more troubling aspect of Craig: why did the Court feel
the need to hear a case that might involve overruling one of its previous
decisions, Moldowan? The test in Moldowan made sense out of the
section, it had been applied by the CRA for over 35 years, there was no
evidence that its application was having any adverse economic or other
effects, and one might have supposed that if Parliament was unhappy
with Moldowan, then Parliament would have amended the Act (in recent
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years, since the Court has been taking a more plain meaning approach to
the statute, Parliament has been quick to amend the Act in response
to decisions it concluded defeated the purposes of the Act). The only criticism of Moldowan came from some practitioners who perhaps
represented clients affected by the decision and from judges and others
who embrace a formalistic style of legal reasoning.
At the outset, we referred to Craig as illustrating a failure of the
judicial process. The adversary system assumes that counsel will fully
inform the Court of all the considerations that it needs to take into
account in reaching a sensible result. However, because of the Court‟s
formalistic reasoning, counsel are discouraged from arguing their cases
by engaging in a serious discussion of tax policy and the consequences of
alternative holdings. Instead, they are encouraged simply to play word
games with one another and the Court. That is no way to resolve serious
public policy issues.

III. FUNDY SETTLEMENT V. CANADA: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
Fundy involved a straightforward issue: how should the residency of
a trust be determined for tax purposes? A trust is a person under the Act,
as are individuals and corporations, and if a person is resident in Canada he
or she is liable to pay tax on his or her worldwide income. Subsection 2(1)
of the Act provides no guidance as to how the residency of a trust is to be
determined. It simply states that, “[a]n income tax shall be paid [by] …
every person resident in Canada”. In effect, the legislature has delegated
to the courts the responsibility for formulating a test of trust residency.
One might have supposed that, in cases of this kind, the courts would
assume responsibility for their lawmaking function and attempt to formulate a test that would satisfy both the purposes the concept serves in the
Act and, to the extent possible, the traditional evaluative criteria of equity, neutrality and simplicity. But even in this case, the Supreme Court
resorted to formalistic reasoning in resolving the issue.
The issue arose in the context of a blatant international tax avoidance
scheme, a scheme that was a variation of a conventional domestic estate
freeze. Although the plan was complex, a stylized version will suffice to
illustrate how the issue arose. A Canadian taxpayer (Mr. Garron) owned a
Canadian manufacturing company (“PMPL”) that he anticipated would
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increase substantially in value.85 If the company did increase in value, he
wished to avoid paying tax on this gain when he sold the shares of the
company at some time in the future. Hence, pursuant to a plan devised by
his tax advisors, he exchanged his common shares in the company for
fixed-value preference shares. He then had the company issue a new
class of common shares to a holding company (New Garron Co.) that
was owned by a trust (Fundy Settlement). The beneficiaries of the trust
were the taxpayer and members of his family. The sole trustee of the
trust was a corporate trustee incorporated in Barbados (St. Michael Trust
Corp.). As a result of the steps taken in this scheme, the plan was that all
future growth in the manufacturing company would accrue to the benefit
of the Barbados trust (the holding company owned by the trust held all
the growth shares in the manufacturing company). Since the trust was not
resident in Canada, the gain would not be taxed in Canada.
Only two years after the implementation of the plan, the trust (Fundy
Settlement) sold the shares of the holding company (New Garron Co.) to
an arm‟s-length purchaser, realizing a capital gain of over $450 million.
The trust argued that the gain should be exempt from Canadian tax since,
under the terms of the tax treaty that Canada has entered into with
Barbados, Canada has agreed that a capital gain realized by a resident of
Barbados, even though it is realized on the sale of shares of a Canadian
company, will only be taxed in Barbados.86 Unsurprisingly, Barbados
does not levy a tax on the capital gains of its residents. Hence the plan
was to distribute the amount realized on the sales of the shares to the
Canadian beneficiaries without any tax being paid on the gain anywhere.
However, the scheme depended upon a finding that the Fundy Settlement
trust was indeed resident in Barbados and not Canada.

85
In fact the company, PMPL Holdings Inc., was owned by Andrew Dunin and a holding
company owned by the members of the Garron family and a Garron family trust. In implementing
the scheme, two separate holding companies were incorporated to hold the growth shares of PMPL
Holdings Inc. and two trusts were established in Barbados, one for each family. The Garron family
trust was known as Fundy Settlement.
86
Agreement Between Canada and Barbados for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, January 22, 1980,
Can. T.S. 1980 No. 29, Article XIV(4): “Gains from the alienation of any property … may be taxed only
in the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident.” Under the treaty the purchaser of the
shares had an obligation to withhold and remit a portion of the sale proceeds to the CRA pursuant to
s. 116 of the Act. Fundy Settlement filed a Canadian income tax return on the basis that it was
exempt from Canadian tax under the treaty and sought a refund of the amount remitted. The CRA
denied the refund and assessed Canadian tax on the gain from the disposition of shares.
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Fundy Settlement argued that for tax purposes trusts are resident where
the trustee resides. In this case the trustee was a corporate trustee that resided
in Barbados. In assessing Fundy Settlement on the gain, the Minister of
National Revenue argued that the test for the residency of trusts should be
the same as the test for corporations, namely, the central management and
control test. Thus, trusts are not necessarily resident where the trustee
resides, but where the trust is in fact managed and controlled. And in this
case there was ample evidence that the trust was in fact managed and
controlled by the beneficiaries, who were resident in Canada.87
1. Lower Courts88
Both lower courts adopted the test for trust residency advanced by
the Minister of National Revenue and found that Fundy Settlement was
in fact controlled by the beneficiaries in Canada. Therefore, they dismissed the taxpayer‟s appeal.
The taxpayer made essentially two arguments as to why the residency of
a trust should be where the trustees reside. First, the taxpayer based its argument on an earlier Federal Court Trial Division case, Thibodeau Family
Trust v. Canada,89 which had been widely accepted as establishing that a
trust is resident in the jurisdiction in which a majority of the trustees are resident.90 Indeed, many tax planning schemes involving offshore trusts,
including the one in Fundy, relied upon this reading of Thibodeau.
In Thibodeau, Gibson J. stated that the corporate test of residency,
where the central management and control resides, was not an appropriate test to be applied to trusts, since trustees have a fiduciary obligation
to manage the trust. In the Tax Court, Woods J. disposed of this reasoning summarily by noting that trustees are not always compliant with their
fiduciary obligations.91 Moreover, upon a careful reading of the case, she
87
Alternatively, the Minister of National Revenue argued that the trusts should be taxed in
Canada under a deeming rule in the Act that applies to trusts, s. 94(1)(c), and on the grounds that the
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) should apply to deny the trusts the benefit of the treaty
exemption. Although both lower courts dealt with these points, the Supreme Court did not.
88
Garron (Trustee of) v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 450, 2009 D.T.C. 1287 (T.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Garron”], affd [2010] F.C.J. No. 145, 2010 FCA 309 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Fundy
(appeal)”], affd [2012] S.C.J. No. 14, 2012 SCC 14 (S.C.C.).
89
Thibodeau Family Trust (Trustee of) v. Canada, [1978] F.C.J. No. 607 (F.C.T.D.)
[hereinafter “Thibodeau”].
90
See Crystal Taylor, “Trust Residency: A Comprehensive Review”, Prairie Provinces Tax
Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2010).
91
Garron, supra, note 88, at para. 150.
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doubted whether the holding of Thibodeau was that in all cases the residency of a trust should be determined to be where the trustees reside. In
the Federal Court of Appeal, Sharlow J.A. also doubted whether
Thibodeau could be read as holding that in every case trusts are resident
where the trustees reside, and in any event stated that “if that is what the
judge in Thibodeau was saying, then I respectfully disagree”.92
The difficulty with a test for the residency of trusts that depends
simply on where the trustees reside is obvious. It is a formal test. It
allows taxpayers to place the residency of a trust in any jurisdiction they
choose through the simple expedient of appointing trustees resident in
that jurisdiction. The test is tantamount to asking taxpayers where they
would like the trusts they are establishing to be taxed. In tax avoidance
arrangements involving offshore trusts, it is well understood that the
trustees appointed, usually in a tax haven jurisdiction, will simply follow
the instructions of the settler or the beneficiaries of the trust.
A second argument the taxpayer made for equating the residency of a
trust with the residency of the trustees is that section 104(1) of the Act
provides that “a reference to a trust … shall, unless the context otherwise
requires, be read to include a reference to a trustee”. In the Tax Court,
Woods J. simply stated that this provision did not assist in determining
the residence of a trust.93 Justice Sharlow in the Federal Court of Appeal
elaborated, reasoning that to give this effect to section 104(1) would give
it a meaning “beyond its words and purpose”. She noted, “[S]ection 104
was enacted to solve the practical problems of tax administration that
would necessarily arise when it was determined that trusts were to be
taxed despite the absence of legal personality.” She went on to say, “I do
not read section 104 as a signal that Parliament intended that, in all cases,
the residence of the trust must be the residence of the trustee.”94 This is
surely a correct reading of section 104(1). It strains credulity to imagine
that when drafting the section the drafters of section 104(1), or anyone
else in the legislative process that might have read the section, had turned
their mind to how the residency of trusts should be determined.
In the Tax Court, Woods J. held that the corporate test of residency,
where the central management and control of the corporation resides,
should also apply to trusts for two reasons. First, she suggested that the
reason for adopting the central management and control test for
92
93
94

Fundy (appeal), supra, note 88, at para. 61.
Garron, supra, note 88, at para. 167.
Fundy (appeal), supra, note 88, at para. 64.
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corporations applies equally to trusts. To avoid the adoption of a formal
test which could be easily manipulated, such as where the corporation was
incorporated, early English cases held by analogy to an individual that a
corporation should be held to reside where “its real business is carried on”,
namely, its “chief seat of management and its centre of trading”.95 Justice
Woods further reflected that the relevant characteristics of corporations and
trusts are similar: “The function of each is, at a basic level, the management
of property.”96 Second, she reasoned that, “adopting a similar test of
residence for trusts and corporations promotes the important principles of
consistency, predictability and fairness in the application of tax law”.97 She
then reviews the evidence at great length and concludes that, “the central
management and control of the Trusts was located in Canada and that the
Trusts were resident in Canada for purposes of the Treaty”.98
In the Federal Court of Appeal, Sharlow J.A. engages in a similar line of
reasoning in holding that the corporate central management and control test
should also apply to trusts. However, she also gives a reason that begins with
a premise about the purpose of the concept of residency: “Generally, the residence of a person is a question of fact, the determination of which requires
consideration of any number of factors that point to or away from an economic or social link between the person and a particular country.”99 She
concludes that since the determination of residence for tax purposes should
be a factual question, the central management and control test should apply
to trusts as well as to corporations.100 In applying the test, she accepts the
Tax Court‟s finding of fact that Fundy Settlement was resident in Canada.
2. Supreme Court101
The Supreme Court‟s decision dismissing the taxpayer‟s appeal was
written by the Court.102 It is short and adds nothing to the analysis in the
lower courts. The Court rejected the taxpayer‟s arguments for adopting

95

De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] A.C. 455, at 458 (H.L.) [hereinafter
“De Beers”], referred to in Garron, supra, note 88, at para. 158.
96
Garron, id., at para. 159.
97
Id., at para. 160.
98
Id., at para. 267.
99
Fundy (appeal), supra, note 88, at para. 53.
100
Id., at para. 62.
101
Fundy, supra, note 17.
102
This type of per curiam decision is usually reserved for constitutional cases where the
Court wants to show its unity on an issue.
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the test of where the trustees reside for the same reasons as the lower
courts.103 It held that the corporate test of where the central management
and control resides was the appropriate test for basically the same two
reasons given by Woods J. in the Tax Court. First, trusts and corporations
are similar in many respects. The Court lists six similarities: they both
hold assets that need to be managed; they both involve the acquisition
and disposition of assets; they both require the management of a business; they both require banking and financial arrangements; they both
require the instruction of advisors; and they both distribute income.104
Second, the Court agreed with Woods J. that adopting the same test
for corporations and trusts would promote (and here the Court quoted
Woods J.), “the important principles of consistency, predictability and
fairness in the application of the tax law”.105
3. Analysis
It always makes sense to give meaning to concepts based upon the
reason for their use. Thus, the residency of a trust should be determined
in a way that furthers the reasons that persons are taxed on the basis of
their residency in the first place. But, that inquiry soon gets complicated
as applied to trusts (and corporations). Basically, countries assert
jurisdiction to tax persons on their worldwide income if those persons
have significant social and economic connections with the country, and
therefore the country is morally justified in imposing a tax on their
income in order to support the government goods and services from
which those persons have benefitted. Residency is the legal concept that
most countries use to determine whether the nexus between a person and
the country meets this standard. The concept works reasonably well as it
applies to individuals since all of their connections with the country can
be considered. It arguably works less well as it applies to legal constructs
like corporations and trusts, and attempting to apply it to them might
even be classified as a category error since there is no justification for
taxing corporations and trusts in their own right (tax justice principles do
not apply to legal constructs). They are taxed simply as a proxy for
taxing the individuals who might benefit from the income accumulating

103
104
105

Fundy, supra, note 17, at paras 10-13.
Id., at para. 14.
Id., at para. 16.
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in them. Nevertheless, the Act requires courts to determine the residency
of corporations and trusts.106
Following the lower court decisions, the Supreme Court determined
the appropriate test for the residency of a trust largely by reasoning that it
should be the same as the test for corporations and applying that test,
namely, the central management and control test. In arguing by analogy
to corporations, the Court pointed out a number of activities that both
trusts and corporations often undertake. It is the case that trusts may
carry on many of the same activities as corporations, but they are very
different legal constructs. One could point to as many differences
between trusts and corporations as similarities. The odd thing about the
Court‟s formal reasoning by analogy is that the similarities between
trusts and corporations that it mentions have little or nothing to do with
the reasons for the use of the concept of residency in tax law. The
Supreme Court also agreed with the trial judge that adopting the same
test for both corporations and trusts would promote “consistency,
predictability and fairness”. But this assertion largely begs the question.
It would only promote consistency and fairness to apply the same test to
both legal constructs if, in fact, the same test should apply to both legal
constructs.
What the Court should have done in this case is posit alternative
possible tests of trust residency and then choose the one that most nearly
captures the reason for the test and that most nearly satisfies the
traditional tax criteria of equity, neutrality and simplicity. As mentioned
above, the test of where the trustees reside is easily dismissed since the
mere presence of a trustee in a jurisdiction is not a strong enough nexus
to tax the trust on its worldwide income. Moreover, it is too easy to
manipulate.
The corporate test of where management and control is exercised is
marginally better. Many trusts involve essentially the holding of property
and the subsequent distribution of income and capital. There is often little
management to be done by the trustees and, even if there is, that does not
provide a strong nexus to a country. It seems odd to argue, for example,
that if a trust is formed in a particular country and subject to that country‟s
laws, and if the settler, beneficiaries and the trust property are all located in
that jurisdiction, that the jurisdiction where the trustee resides has a strong
106
Over the past number of years, reforms have been made to the income tax in most
countries to diminish the significance of the concept of residency as it applies to legal constructs like
corporations and trusts.
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claim to tax the trust on its worldwide income. The trustee might be little
more than someone named in a document.
Further, the test of where the central control and management resides
is relatively easy to manipulate. In Fundy, the Minister was able to produce evidence that the trust was in fact managed from Canada because
the parties were obviously proceeding on the basis that the trust would be
resident where the trustees resided. However, now that tax planners are
aware that the Minister will be enforcing a test of residency of where the
trust is managed, they will be sure to prepare documentation that suggests it was being managed by trustees offshore. In theory, the test should
be difficult to manipulate since few taxpayers would be willing to give
up control over their property to a trustee in a tax haven even if it meant
saving some tax. However, aggressive taxpayers will be careful to prepare a record showing that central management and control was being
exercised by the trustees, and it will be difficult for the Minister to gather
evidence showing otherwise.
A more sensible test of trust residence would look at all the facts and
circumstances relating to the trust and determine whether, based on that
factual inquiry, the trust had a sufficiently close nexus with the
jurisdiction that it could be justifiably taxed on its worldwide income.
The facts would include where the trust was formed; the private law that
governs it; where the settler, beneficiaries and trustees reside; the
location of the trust‟s assets; the location of the trust‟s advisors; and
where it was managed and controlled. Indeed, the concept of residency is
most sensibly applied to individuals, and thus the Court might have more
appropriately analogized to individuals instead of corporations in
formulating a test of residency for trusts. And, of course, section 104(2)
provides that “[a] trust shall, for the purposes of this Act … be deemed in
respect of the trust property an individual”. The residency of individuals
is determined by examining all of the connections of an individual with
the jurisdiction. Also, a facts and circumstances or connecting factors test
is used in other areas of tax law where a nexus must be made between
income and a jurisdiction. For example, in determining whether “the
personal property of an Indian or a band is situated on a reserve” under
section 87(1)(b) of the Indian Act,107 the Supreme Court adopted a
connecting factors analysis that it derived from the purpose of the
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exemption in section 87.108 Finally, in private international law, where no
applicable law is chosen, a trust is generally governed by the law with
which it is most closely connected.
A final irony of basing the test for the residency of trusts on an analogy to the test for corporations is that, arguably, that test no longer makes
much sense even as it applies to corporations. In the leading English case
of corporation residency, which the Canadian courts all follow, De
Beers,109 the House of Lords held that a corporation is resident where it
“really keeps house and does business” and that “the real business is carried on where the central management and control actually abides”. But
why isn‟t the real business of a corporation carried on where the raw materials are recovered, where the products are manufactured, where the
workers reside, where the products are sold, or where the profits are distributed? The House of Lords chose that test, in part, because as Lord
Loreburn reasoned, in the absence of such a test, a corporation could
have “its chief seat of management and its centre of trading in England
under the protection of English law, and yet escape the appropriate taxation by the simple expedient of being registered abroad and distributing
its dividends abroad”.110 The policy that those who benefit from the protection of English law should pay taxes in that country was crucial to the
court‟s decision. When England was the dominant economic and military
power and had one of the most advanced legal systems in the world, it
might have made sense to suggest that corporations with their central
management and control in the U.K. derived substantial benefits from
operating out of that country. But now corporations operating around the
world are unlikely to be deriving the greatest benefit, or much benefit at
all, from the jurisdiction in which their central management and control
are located. Consequently, arguably a facts and circumstances or connecting factors test should also be used in deciding on the residency of
corporations. Although such a test for corporate residency has been suggested by thoughtful commentators, they recognize that it would create
difficulties, particularly in the context of international conventions and
treaties.111 Nevertheless, the obvious shortcomings of the corporate test

108
Williams v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1992] S.C.J. No. 36, [1992]
1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.).
109
De Beers, supra, note 95.
110
Id., at 458.
111
See Robert Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation (Amsterdam:
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2002), at 260; Brian Arnold, “A Tax Policy Perspective
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of residency, even as it is applied to corporations, makes one wonder
why anyone would think it was an appropriate analogy in developing a
test for trusts.
Fundy represents a missed opportunity to develop a test for the residency of trusts based on the legal, political and economic benefits the
trust might be deriving from Canada and on the need to have tax rules
that are difficult to manipulate.

IV. CANADA V. GLAXOSMITHKLINE INC.: MAKING THE TAX
WORLD SAFE FOR MULTINATIONALS
1. The Transfer Pricing Problem
Over the past few years, newspapers, particularly in the U.K. and
U.S., have been filled with stories about the failure of large multinationals to pay tax anywhere in the world. Think about the coverage of
Amazon,112 Apple,113 Cadbury,114 Ikea,115 Starbucks,116 Google117 and
eBay,118 among others. It is now common knowledge that multinationals
have deflected trillions of dollars of profits to tax havens. Several international Non-governmental Organizations (“NGOs”), who are primarily
concerned with the billions of dollars of taxes that multinationals have
avoided paying in the low-income countries in which they operate, have
on Corporate Residence” (2003) 51:4 Can. Tax J. 1559, at 1562; Michael McIntyre, “Determining the
Residence of Members of a Corporate Group” (2003) 51:3 Can. Tax J. 1567, at 1572.
112
Simon Bowers & Patrick Wintour, “Amazon told: time is up for tax avoidance” The
Guardian (July 19, 2013), online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/19/
oecd-tax-reform-proposals-amazon>.
113
Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, “How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes” The
New York Times (April 28, 2012), online: The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/
29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html?_r=0>.
114
Sally Gainsbury, Jonathan Ford & Vanessa Houlder, “Pre-takeover Cadbury‟s aggressive
tax avoidance exposed” Financial Times (June 20, 2013), online: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
ae066430-d9a8-11e2-98fa-00144feab7de.html>.
115
Josephine Moulds, “Anger grows over large companies‟ tax bills as attention turns to
eBay and Ikea” The Guardian (October 21, 2012), online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.
com/business/2012/oct/21/multinational-firms-tax-ebay-ikea>.
116
Simon Neville & Jill Treanor, “Starbucks to pay £20m in tax over next two years after
customer revolt” The Guardian (December 6, 2012), online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.
com/business/2012/dec/06/starbucks-to-pay-10m-corporation-tax>.
117
Peter Gumbel, “How U.S. Firms like Google and Amazon Minimize Their European
Taxes” Time (December 4, 2012), online: Time: Business & Money <http://business.time.com/
2012/12/04/how-u-s-firms-like-google-and-amazon-minimize-their-european-taxes/>.
118
Supra, note 115.

(2014), 64 S.C.L.R. (2d)

TAX LAW

305

urged a complete revamping of the rules of international tax so that multinationals cannot avoid paying taxes in countries where they earn their
profits.119 However, even organizations representing the most powerful
nations in the world, such as the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development (“OECD”) and the G8, have joined the call for reforms
in international tax that might limit the ability of multinationals to abuse
tax systems around the world.120
Transfer pricing provides a striking example of what is wrong with
the tax rules that apply to multinationals. The facts of GlaxoSmithKline121 vividly illustrate how transfer pricing is no answer to the
question of how fairly to allocate multinational profits to countries in
which they operate. And the Supreme Court‟s resolution of the issue only
exacerbates the problems.
Here is how the problem arises. Multinationals invariably have dozens, even hundreds, of subsidiaries operating in countries around the
world. Hence, a method must be found to determine how much of a multinational‟s worldwide profits have been earned in each country so that
each country can levy an income tax on the profits earned in that country.
This is done in almost all countries, including Canada, by requiring multinationals to assign prices to all the goods and services that flow
between the related members of a corporate group. In tax parlance, these
prices are referred to as transfer prices.
Unless prevented from doing so, corporations belonging to a related
group of corporations could easily avoid income taxes in a particular
country through the manipulation of these transfer prices. For example,
to minimize the taxes on its worldwide income, if a multinational has a
subsidiary in a country with a high tax rate and it is receiving goods and
services from a related corporation in a low-tax country, the transfer
price might be set very high. Hence the subsidiary in the high-tax country would have higher expenses and lower profits, while the subsidiary in
the low-tax country would have higher profits.
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Naturally, most countries have rules that attempt to prevent the manipulation of transfer prices. In Canada, for the period covering the
reassessment of GlaxoSmithKline, 1990-1993, section 69(2) provided that
where a taxpayer has paid … to a non-resident person with whom the
taxpayer was not dealing at arm‟s length as price … for … any property
… an amount greater than the amount … that would have been
reasonable in the circumstances if the non-resident person and the
taxpayer had been dealing at arm‟s length, the reasonable amount shall
… be deemed to have been the amount that was paid.122

Although the wording of the rules differs from country to country,
almost every country has adopted rules that require related corporations
to determine their transfer prices based on what is referred to as the
arm‟s-length standard. Basically, the rules require that transfer prices
reflect the price for the goods and services transferred that would have
been charged on a sale between unrelated enterprises. The obvious
objective of the arm‟s-length standard is to require taxpayers engaging in
a transaction with related parties to report for tax purposes the income
that they would have earned if they had engaged in a comparable
transaction with unrelated parties. Hence the standard promotes tax
parity between those taxpayers that engage in transactions with related
parties and those otherwise similarly situated taxpayers that engage in
comparable transactions with unrelated parties.
2. Facts and Issue
As it has been known since 2000, GlaxoSmithKline, a U.K. multinational, is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. One
of its wholly owned subsidiaries, Glaxo Group, also a U.K. corporation,
in turn, wholly owns Glaxo Canada. In 1988, Glaxo Canada and its parent corporation, Glaxo Group, entered into a licensing agreement (which
replaced a somewhat similar consultancy agreement that the two companies had entered into in 1972) under which, in return for a royalty of
six per cent on the net sale of drugs in Canada, Glaxo Canada received
the following services and intangibles from its parent corporation: the
right to manufacture, use and sell products; the right to use the trademarks
owned by Glaxo Group, including Zantac; the right to receive technical
122
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assistance for its secondary manufacturing requirements; the right to use
registration material prepared by Glaxo Group; access to new products,
including line extensions; access to improvements in drugs; the right to
have Glaxo Group companies sell to Glaxo Canada any raw materials;
marketing support; and indemnification against damages arising from
patent infringement actions.
In 1976, Glaxo Group discovered the pharmaceutical ingredient
ranitidine, which is used to relieve stomach ulcers without the need for
surgery. The manufacture of the drug was undertaken, in part, by a
related corporation in Singapore, where the manufacturing of the drug
benefited from a 10-year tax holiday and then a low rate of tax of only
10 per cent. The Singapore manufacturing company sold the drug to
another related corporation in Switzerland, Adechsa.
In 1982, Glaxo Canada began selling ranitidine in Canada under the
brand name Zantac. In 1983, Glaxo Canada entered into a supply agreement with its sister corporation in Switzerland, Adechsa, for the purchase
of ranitidine. In calculating its profits in Canada between 1990 and 1992,
Glaxo Canada deducted the transfer price that Adechsa charged it for the
ranitidine, between $1,512 and $1,651 per kilogram. During the same
period, two Canadian generic drug companies were purchasing their
ranitidine from arm‟s-length manufacturers for between $194 and $304
per kilogram, or between five to seven times less than the transfer price
Glaxo Canada was being charged by its sister corporation. The basic tax
planning is obvious and was noted by Rip A.C.J. (as he then was) in the
Tax Court.123 By charging a high price for ranitidine in Canada, the corporate group was moving amounts that would otherwise be taxed in
Canada at a corporate rate of about 45 per cent to Switzerland and then
on to Singapore, where the amounts benefited from a tax holiday.
In reassessing Glaxo Canada, the Minister of National Revenue
disallowed the deduction of the price paid to Adechsa in excess of the
highest monthly price per kilogram of ranitidine paid by the two
Canadian generic pharmaceutical companies to their unrelated suppliers.
Any amount paid over that the Minister treated as a dividend distribution.
This amount would not be deductible from profits and a withholding tax
would be imposed. The disallowance was based on section 69(2), quoted
above, and which applies where a taxpayer is not dealing at arm‟s length
123
GlaxoSmithKline Inc. v. Canada, [2008] T.C.J. No. 249, 2008 TCC 324, at para. 13
(T.C.C.), revd [2010] F.C.J. No. 953, 2010 FCA 201 (F.C.A.), affd [2012] S.C.J. No. 52, [2012] 3
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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with a non-resident and pays an amount greater than the amount, “that
would have been reasonable in the circumstances if the non-resident
person and the taxpayer had been dealing at arm‟s length”.
A number of methods might be used in determining whether transfer
prices are reasonable. However, the most widely accepted method is
commonly referred to as the comparable uncontrolled price (“CUP”)
method.124 This involves finding an appropriate arm‟s-length transaction
with which to compare the transaction to which the transfer price has
been assigned. Obviously the circumstances surrounding the two transactions have to be similar if the comparison is to be valid. In this case, the
Minister of National Revenue argued that the most appropriate comparators were the other Canadian companies buying ranitidine from arm‟slength manufacturers. The taxpayer argued that those cases were not
comparable because Glaxo Canada was not just paying for ranitidine
from Adechsa but was paying as well for a number of intangibles from
which it benefited as a member of the corporate group and as a result of
the licensing agreement it had entered into with Glaxo Group. Just looking at the amount paid to Adechsa as being for the purchase of tangible
property did not reflect the economic and business realities of Glaxo
Canada. When all of the relevant surrounding circumstances were considered, an amount equal to five to seven times the market price of
ranitidine was not an unreasonable transfer price.
The Supreme Court stated the issue in the case this way: “what circumstances are to be taken into account in determining the reasonable
arm‟s-length price against which to compare the non-arm‟s-length transfer price”?125
3. Tax Court of Canada126
In a lengthy and thorough judgment, Rip A.C.J. (now Chief Justice of
the Tax Court) essentially upheld the Minister‟s reassessment. He held that

124
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development published an extensive
commentary on transfer pricing methodology in 1979, which it updated in 1994. Most countries rely
on these commentaries in analyzing transfer prices. They were dealt with extensively by the Tax
Court of Canada in this case and referred to by both the Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Transfer pricing guidelines for
multinational enterprises and tax administrators: report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs
(Paris: OECD Publications, 1994).
125
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it would only have been reasonable for Glaxo Canada to pay Adechsa an
amount equal to the highest price paid by the generic pharmaceutical
companies. Amounts paid in excess of that should be treated as a dividend
distribution or a benefit the taxpayer desired to have conferred on Adechsa,
and as such were non-deductible and should be subject to non-resident
withholding taxes.
In determining that the transfer prices were unreasonable, he concluded that the CUP method was appropriate and that the purchases of
ranitidine made by the two generic pharmaceutical companies from
arm‟s-length suppliers were comparable to the purchases that Glaxo
Canada made from Adechsa.
He reviewed at some length all of the factors the OECD suggest
should be considered when determining whether two transactions are
comparable (from the OECD commentary on transfer pricing methodology). He found that, in this case, the purchases by the Canadian companies
were comparable to Glaxo Canada‟s purchases from its related company.127 Further, he stated that, “in the appeals at bar, the business
circumstances and strategies that the appellant submits distinguish it from
the generic companies have no bearing on the transfer pricing issue”.128
The taxpayer argued that one consideration which distinguished the
transfer prices from the uncontrolled prices was that Glaxo Canada was
contractually bound to purchase the drug from a related corporation. In
holding that this did not make them “reasonable in the circumstances”,
Rip A.C.J. stated: “If the legislation intended that the phrase „reasonable
in the circumstances‟ in subsection 69(2) should include all contractual
terms there would be no purpose to subsection 69(2); any MNE [Multinational Enterprise] would be able to claim that its parent company
would not allow it to purchase from another supplier.”129
Associate Chief Justice Rip also concluded that the intangible rights
provided to Glaxo Canada under the licensing agreement with Glaxo
Group were not relevant in determining the appropriate transfer price for
the ranitidine. He noted that the benefits these intangibles provided
Glaxo Canada were paid for in an entirely separate transaction and with
a different party (Glaxo Group, not Adechsa). Although he appeared
to find, after a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, that
the licensing agreement was entirely separate from the supply agreement,
127
128
129
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he also suggested that as a matter of law he could not consider the
licensing agreement in assessing the reasonableness of the supply
agreement. He referred to a Supreme Court of Canada case, Singleton v.
Canada,130 as holding that, in characterizing a particular legal
transaction, other transactions or economic realities should be ignored: “I
agree with the respondent that the Supply Agreement with Adechsa and
the Licence Agreement with Glaxo Group cover separate matters and that
they are to be considered independently as required by Singleton.”131
4. Federal Court of Appeal132
The Federal Court of Appeal held that Rip A.C.J. had made an error in
law in interpreting the clause “reasonable in the circumstances” in
section 69(2), and therefore overturned his decision. The error he made
was in holding that he could not consider all of the circumstances
surrounding the transfer price charged in determining whether it was
reasonable. In particular, he should have considered the terms of the
licensing agreement in deciding whether or not the prices charged in the
supply agreement were reasonable. In arriving at a reasonable price,
the test is not what a reasonable person might pay in the open market for
the ranitidine, that is, its fair market value, but “whether any reasonable
business person, dealing at arm‟s length with Adechsa, would have paid
the price paid by the appellant for its ranitidine”.133 And in making that
judgment, the judge should have considered all of the circumstances
surrounding the relationship between Glaxo Canada and Adechsa. These
circumstances included the fact that “Glaxo Group owned the Zantac
trademark … . Zantac commanded a premium over generic ranitidine drugs.
Glaxo Group owned the ranitidine patent … [and] [w]ithout the License
Agreement, the appellant would not have been in a position to use the
ranitidine patent and the Zantac trademark”.134 Because of these
circumstances, and because it was required to buy ranitidine from a member
of the corporate group, Glaxo Canada would be willing to pay more for the
drug than a generic pharmaceutical company purchasing ranitidine.

130
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The Federal Court of Appeal sent the case back to the Tax Court for a
re-hearing of the appropriate transfer price so that all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction could be taken into account.
5. Supreme Court
In a unanimous decision, written by Rothstein J., the Supreme Court
dismissed the Minister‟s appeal and essentially followed the Federal
Court of Appeal‟s reasoning. In determining the reasonableness of transfer pricing, the question is what price an arm‟s-length person would have
paid in circumstances similar to those faced by the taxpayer. This inquiry
might require going beyond the facts of the particular transaction and
examining all of the surrounding circumstances, in particular the taxpayer‟s economic and business realities. In this case, that would include the
terms of the licence agreement.
Justice Rothstein stated that, as a justification for ignoring the
licensing agreement, Rip A.C.J. had misconstrued Singleton. He discussed
at some length how that case dealt with an entirely different issue.135 In
this case, he held that the licence agreement was a relevant circumstance
and the most important reason that, “the generic comparators [used by Rip
A.C.J.] do not reflect the economic and business reality of Glaxo
Canada”.136 The following paragraph summarizes why he found that it was
necessary to consider the licence and supply agreements together in order
to arrive at a realistic picture of the profits of Glaxo Canada:
It cannot be irrelevant that Glaxo Canada‟s function was primarily a
secondary manufacturer and marketer. It did not originate new products
and the intellectual property rights associated with them. Nor did it
undertake the investment and risk involved with originating new
products. Nor did it have the other risks and investment costs which
Glaxo Group undertook under the license agreement. The prices paid
by Glaxo Canada to Adechsa were a payment for a bundle of at least
some rights and benefits under the License Agreement and product
under the Supply Agreement.137

To the extent that part of the purchase price paid under the supply
agreement was compensation for rights provided in the licence agreement, Rothstein J. stated that these amounts might be royalties for
135
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intellectual property rights, such as being able to sell ranitidine under the
trade name Zantac, and that to the extent that part of the purchase price
was for these rights, there should have been a non-resident withholding
tax imposed.138 But apart from these rights to intellectual property, he
said that the licensing agreement also gave Glaxo “guaranteed access to
new products, the right to the supply of raw materials and materials in
bulk, marketing support, and technical assistance for setting up new
product lines”.139 These rights, along with other considerations, such as
the “certain degree of comfort” Glaxo Canada had in purchasing from a
related corporation that had demonstrated “good manufacturing practices”, all had value and consideration for them was presumably included in
the transfer price.140
Following the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, Rothstein J.
remitted the matter back to the Tax Court to redetermine a reasonable
transfer price, “having regard to the effect of the Licence Agreement on
the prices paid by Glaxo Canada for the supply of ranitidine from
Adechsa”.141
6. Analysis
The Supreme Court did not settle any general proposition of law in
this case. In applying the arm‟s-length principle by use of the CUP method, it is indisputable that all economically relevant circumstances must
be considered in ensuring that the comparator arm‟s-length transaction is
sufficiently comparable to the contested non-arm‟s-length transaction.
However, the Court‟s judgment might be read as suggesting that, in almost all cases, the business and economic circumstances surrounding a
taxpayer who is a member of a corporate group distinguishes its transactions with related corporations from arm‟s-length transfers. If read this
broadly, it would be almost impossible for tax departments to regulate
transfer prices. In every case, myriad unique circumstances will distinguish transfers between related corporations from transfers between
unrelated corporations.
In this case, the Court held specifically that both the licence and
supply agreements that Glaxo Canada had entered into — one with its
138
139
140
141
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parent corporation for certain intangibles and the other with its sister
corporation for the supply of ranitidine — were relevant in arriving at a
realistic picture of the profits of Glaxo Canada. That proposition surely
cannot be correct.
First, the rights that Glaxo Canada had acquired under the licence
agreement with its parent had been paid for separately. Under that
agreement, Glaxo Canada was obligated to pay its parent a royalty of
six per cent of its net sales for the intangibles offered in the agreement.
Hence, if part of the purchase price for the ranitidine included an amount
for these rights, Glaxo Canada would be paying for them twice. It might
be that the royalty paid under the licence agreement was too low and
therefore part of the purchase price was compensating for the low
royalty, but if the royalty was too low the obvious solution would have
been to increase the royalty. A royalty payment would, of course, have
been subject to non-resident withholding tax. So, perhaps what the
taxpayer was attempting to do was to convert a royalty payment into a
payment for the cost of goods sold, which would be fully deductible
from its profits with no withholding tax required to be remitted. If so,
they should not have gotten away with it.
Second, the rights under the licence agreement, and the other advantages that Glaxo Canada received by being a member of the corporate
group, were conferred on it by Glaxo Group, its parent corporation.
Payments for these rights should be made to its parent corporation in the
U.K. Why would the payments be made to Adechsa in Switzerland?
Adechsa did not own the rights under the licensing agreement.
Third, if the transfer price that Glaxo Canada paid Adechsa included
an amount for the ranitidine as well as certain intangibles, then those advantages should have been unbundled. Most of the advantages that the
Supreme Court mentioned that Glaxo Canada derived from the licensing
agreement had little to do with the distribution of Zantac in Canada. They
should have been separately characterized and priced.
Finally, the question as to whether the licencing agreement was a relevant consideration in determining the reasonableness of the transfer
price that Glaxo Canada paid to Adechsa is a factual question that requires a careful review of all the facts and circumstances. In the Tax
Court, Rip A.C.J. carefully and exhaustively reviewed all of the facts and
circumstances of the case. Unfortunately, he did not explicitly find on the
basis of the facts and circumstances that the licensing agreement was not
relevant, but instead stated that he was bound by Singleton not to consider the licensing agreement. This enabled the higher courts to hold that he
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had made an error in law, but given his general findings it should have
been beside the point.
In terms of attempting to rein in tax avoidance by multinationals,
there are more troublesome difficulties with the Supreme Court‟s
judgment. On one reading, the Supreme Court seems to be suggesting
that the tax department has to take into account, as part of the relevant
circumstances in comparing a transfer price to an arm‟s-length price, the
corporate group‟s worldwide pricing strategy. But, of course, that is
precisely what the arm‟s-length standard is designed to avoid. Invariably,
one important purpose of the corporate group‟s worldwide pricing
strategy will be to minimize its worldwide taxes. Glaxo Group‟s
worldwide pricing strategy was relevant in considering whether Glaxo
Canada was paying a reasonable transfer price, and it would have been
relevant to a third party if it were assumed they were similarly a member
of the corporate group, but it would not be reasonable if the third party
were not a member of the group, which is precisely what the arm‟slength standard attempts to test.
If the Supreme Court‟s insistence that the unique circumstances of
being a member of a corporate group is relevant to the determination of a
reasonable transfer price is followed, and particularly if multinationals
are allowed to bundle intangibles as part of every transaction, it will be
impossible to find a comparable arm‟s-length transaction. If the tax department has to consider all the contractual terms binding members of a
corporate group, there would be no point to the arm‟s-length standard.
The benefits of the comparable uncontrolled price standard are that it
provides some certainty in regulating transfer prices, makes it more difficult for multinationals to manipulate their transfer prices, and is easier to
enforce. Even in this case, as conducted, the Tax Court sat for 47 days,
heard from 10 expert witnesses and 25 other witnesses, and was presented with more than 23,000 pages of documents filed as exhibits. The
holistic approach to transfer pricing advocated by the Supreme Court will
only further complicate the factual issues that have to be resolved and
thus further facilitate tax avoidance. Further, it appears inconsistent with
the OECD commentaries on transfer pricing.142
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At the end of his judgment, Rothstein J. offered guidance to the Tax
Court for redetermining whether the transfer prices in the case are reasonable. First, he stated: “It is doubtful that comparators will be identical
in all material respects in almost any case. Therefore, some leeway must
be allowed in the determination of a reasonable amount.” Second, he advised that the trial judge must consider the functions, resources and risks
inherent in both Glaxo Canada and its parent corporation. And third,
Rothstein J. stated that, “the interests of Glaxo Group and Glaxo Canada
must both be considered”.143
This is an odd list of guiding factors. It is unclear why the guidelines
give such emphasis to the interest of the parent corporation since it was
not a party to the transaction. But more importantly, they all suggest that
multinationals must be given more leeway in setting their own transfer
prices. Instead of these guidelines, why didn‟t Rothstein J. caution the
courts below about the need to review transfer prices in a way that would
reduce the ability of multinationals to avoid taxes, or about the need to
proceed in a way that would provide certainty and that could be reasonably enforced? Or indeed, why didn‟t he bemoan the obvious and
egregious attempts at tax avoidance that the corporate group was attempting in this case and the serious costs such tax avoidance imposes on
the tax system? Tax avoiders such as GlaxoSmithKline may need this
kind of rigorous examination.144

V. CALGARY (CITY) V. CANADA: GUIDANCE IN APPLYING THE GST
This case involves the application of the GST,145 and is only the second
GST case the Supreme Court has heard.146 The federal government enacted
the GST in 1991. Two general GST issues that have been frequently litigated
in lower courts were raised in the case: whether a particular supply of goods
and services (in this case, transit facilities and transit services) constituted a

143

Supra, note 18, at paras. 61-63.
In 2006, GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay US$3.4 billion to the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) to settle a transfer pricing dispute that involved the sale of Zantac and other drugs in the
U.S. It was the largest settlement in IRS history. See Internal Revenue Service, “IRS Accepts
Settlement Offer in Largest Transfer Pricing Dispute” (September 11, 2006), online:
<http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Accepts-Settlement-Offer-in-Largest-Transfer-Pricing-Dispute>.
145
The Goods and Services Tax is Part IX of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15.
146
The first GST appeal was heard in 2009 in United Parcel Service Canada Ltd. v. Canada,
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single supply or multiple supplies, and whether a grant or subsidy was given
(in this case, by the Province of Alberta to the City of Calgary) for a public
purpose or was consideration for a supply. No interpretive issue was raised
in the case: it simply involved applying well-accepted concepts of a
consumption tax to particular facts.
For those unfamiliar with the operation of the GST, some background on the tax is necessary to understand the issues.
1. Overview of the GST
In principle, the GST is a tax on the final consumption of all goods
and services in Canada. Its incidence is equivalent to a single-stage retail
sales tax that is imposed on all goods and services consumed by
individuals. However, instead of being a single-stage sales tax, the GST
is a multi-stage sales tax. It is imposed not only on transfers to
individuals for final consumption, but also on all transfers of goods and
services (in the GST legislation referred to collectively as supplies)
between all businesses at every stage of the production and distribution
process. All qualifying businesses must register and collect the GST.
Business is defined broadly in the legislation and does not require a
profit motive. Thus, charities and even public sector organizations are
required to register and collect the tax on their supplies if they are
engaged in “commercial activities” (again, a term that is defined
broadly). It makes sense to apply the GST to charities and public sector
organizations since they often provide goods and services to individuals,
and if the tax is to be a comprehensive tax on the value of goods and
services consumed by individuals, these entities must be required to
collect the tax on the goods and services they provide. However, as
described below, and an important fact in this case, many public sector
organizations engage in activities with a public purpose (such as public
transit services) on which, in part for policy reasons, the GST is not
levied on the final consumer.
Although all businesses are charged the GST on their purchases, a
mechanism is provided to refund the tax paid by businesses because the
tax is intended to be a tax on only the final consumption of individuals.
This objective is achieved through the mechanism of an “input tax
credit”. When a business sells supplies, it collects the tax from the
purchaser; however, it is entitled to claim an input tax credit for the tax it
paid on its own purchases. Hence it only remits to the government the
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difference between the amount of GST it collects on its sales and the
amount of any input tax credit to which it is entitled. Input tax credits
relieve business inputs of GST and thus avoid the pyramiding of the tax
while firms increase the value of goods and services throughout the
production and distribution process. Consequently, the GST is actually
paid by each business only on the value that it has added to the supply.
For that reason, in most countries, the GST is called a value-added tax
(“VAT”). The full GST is eventually paid by individual consumers.
Although the businesses from which they purchase supplies will have
collected the tax on their behalf, individual consumers cannot claim an
input tax credit. This multi-stage method of collecting a sales tax from
consumers might sound convoluted, but it operates relatively smoothly,
increases compliance and, just as importantly, ensures that business
inputs do not bear the tax — that is to say, it ensures that all of the tax is
passed on to individual consumers.
There is one other aspect of the GST that is important in understanding the legal issues in this case. Under the GST, supplies of goods and
services are divided into three categories — taxable supplies, zero-rated
supplies and exempt supplies. If suppliers supply a “taxable supply”,
they must charge the GST to the purchaser and they are entitled to claim
the full input tax credit for any GST they might have paid on their related
purchases to provide the supply. This is how the tax should operate for
all supplies. However, for policy reasons, some supplies are “zero-rated”
and others are “exempt”. If suppliers supply a “zero-rated supply”, they
do not charge the GST on the sale, and they may claim the full input tax
credit on purchases used to provide the supply. Hence zero-rated supplies
are completely exempt from the GST. In Canada, prescription drugs,
medical devices, basic groceries, and exported goods and services are
zero-rated — they do not bear GST. If suppliers supply an exempt supply, they do not charge the purchaser GST, but the suppliers are not
entitled to an input tax credit in respect of purchases to provide the supply. Hence, paradoxically, although these goods and services are referred
to as exempt, in fact the GST that the supplier paid on the purchases attributable to the exempt supplies will be buried in the cost of the goods
and services to the ultimate purchaser. Examples of exempt goods and
services include health care and child care services, educational services,
most financial services, sales of residential housing and rentals of residential premises, and some supplies by public sector organizations that
serve a public purpose such as municipal transit services.

318

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2014), 64 S.C.L.R. (2d)

2. Facts
Against this background, we turn to the facts of the case. The City of
Calgary is a registrant under the GST and therefore has to pay GST on all
of its purchases. To the extent that it makes taxable supplies to another
entity or an individual, it is entitled, by claiming an input tax credit, to a
refund of the GST it pays on the purchases related to those supplies.
However, to the extent that it makes exempt supplies, it will not collect
the GST on the provision of those supplies, but neither will it be entitled
to claim an input tax credit for the GST it paid on its purchases related to
those supplies.
One of the significant exempt supplies made by the City of Calgary is
“municipal transit services” provided to members of the public. Hence,
the users of the Calgary municipal transit services are not directly charged
GST for this service. Naturally, in the course of providing transit services
to the public, the City acquired and constructed transit infrastructure,
stations, and equipment such as trains and buses (transit facilities). It paid
GST on all the purchases necessary to acquire or build these transit
facilities. For a number of years, the City treated these purchases as
relating to the exempt supply of providing transit services to the public
and therefore did not claim an input tax credit for the GST paid in relation
to the purchases. However, in 2003 it changed its tax filing position and
claimed input tax credits for a number of these purchases, arguing that
they did not relate to the exempt supply of transit services to the public,
but instead related to separate taxable supplies of transit facilities that it
had made to the Province.147 The City supported its claim that it had made
a separate taxable supply of transit facilities to the Province by noting that
the Province had provided substantial funding for these transit facilities
pursuant to contractual obligations it had undertaken with the City. On
this basis, in filing its January 2003 GST return the City claimed a refund
of $6.3 million from the federal government for GST that it had paid on

147

In most instances, little would be gained by a registrant in taking this position since,
while they would be entitled to input tax credits on their purchases, their supply of taxable goods and
services would be taxable. In this case, however, the supply was being made to the Province of
Alberta and, under the Canadian Constitution, provinces are not required to pay the GST. Thus, a
supply to the Province would be effectively treated as a zero-rated supply. Some provinces, notably
those provinces that have coordinated their provincial sales taxes with the federal GST, have agreed
to pay the tax on their purchases.
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its purchases for the construction of transit facilities and for which it had
not received a rebate.148
The CRA assessed the City and denied its right to claim these input
tax credits. It argued that the City was only making one supply, namely,
transit services to the public, which were an exempt supply, and hence
input tax credits could not be claimed on purchases related to the supply.
Further, the CRA argued that the City did not make a supply for
consideration to the Province. The funding the Province provided to the
City for the transit facilities was a public purpose subsidy and not
consideration for a supply. The City appealed to the Tax Court of Canada,
which allowed its appeal.
3. Tax Court of Canada149
Associate Chief Justice Rossiter of the Tax Court did not address the
question of whether on the facts of this case there could be two supplies
or whether all the elements of the transactions should be treated simply
as one supply. He assumed there could be two supplies — one involving
the construction of the transit system and the other its operation. Instead
he only dealt with the issue of whether the funding the Province provided
for the transit facilities was consideration for a supply.
He carefully reviewed the logic of the GST legislation and
determined that the case turned on whether or not the Province had paid
consideration for the supply of transit facilities from the City. Referring to
the relevant definitions in the Act, as well as a leading Federal Court of
Appeal case on the distinction between funding for a public purpose and
consideration for a supply, Commission scolaire Des Chênes v. Canada,150
he held that “in order for the funding provided by the Province of the

148
Certain public sector organizations, including municipalities, receive a partial rebate of
the GST paid on their purchases. The reason for this partial rebate scheme is that, prior to 1991, the
former federal sales tax would have been buried in the price of many purchases made by public
sector organizations. When the GST was introduced, although public sector organizations would
have to pay GST on their purchases, the federal government indicated that they would not pay more
tax than they did under the former federal sales tax. Hence, the government introduced a scheme of
partial rebates for the GST paid by these organizations. The City of Calgary was entitled to claim a
rebate of 57.14 per cent of the GST it paid. The refund it was claiming in this case was the difference
between that amount and a full refund of the tax it had paid over several years. After this case, in
February 2004, the public service body rebate for municipalities was raised to 100 per cent.
149
Calgary (City) v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 195, 2009 TCC 272 (T.C.C.), revd [2010]
F.C.J. No. 700, 2010 FCA 127 (F.C.A.), affd [2012] S.C.J. No. 20, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 689 (S.C.C.).
150
[2001] F.C.J. No. 1559, 2001 FCA 264 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Des Chênes”].
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Appellant to constitute consideration, (1) it must have been provided
pursuant to a legal obligation (contractual or otherwise), and (2) it must be
closely enough linked to a supply that it may be regarded as having been
made „for‟ that supply”.151
Justice Rossiter reviewed the various agreements that the Province
had entered into with the City for the provision of the funding and concluded that they imposed a legal obligation on the Province to provide
the funding and that this contractual obligation itself resulted in “a direct
link between the funding provided by the Province and the supply in
question”.152 He explained, “[A]s noted by the Federal Court of Appeal
in Des Chênes … a payment made under a contract will inevitably meet
the requirement of a direct link since the very existence of the obligation
to pay is conditional on the co-contracting party fulfilling the corresponding obligations under the terms of the contract.”153
One difficulty with the City‟s argument that it had made a taxable
supply to the Province was that the Province did not appear to have
received anything in return for its funding. The City retained ownership of
all the transit facilities and used them in supplying transit services to the
Calgary public. However, again relying on Des Chênes, Rossiter J. noted
that in order for the funding to constitute consideration, it was not necessary
for the Province to have received something itself. What the Province
received was the provision of transit services to the Calgary public.
4. Federal Court of Appeal154
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Tax Court judge
had misinterpreted the agreements between the City and the Province.
Writing for the court, Pelletier J. held that those agreements did not require the City to provide the Province with a transportation system, but
instead they were simply funding agreements under which the funds for
approved projects were to be disbursed and administered.155 The general
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Supra, note 149, at para. 41 (T.C.J.).
Id., at para. 45.
Id.
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Calgary (City) v. Canada, [2010] F.C.J. No. 700, 2010 FCA 127 (F.C.A.), affd [2012]
S.C.J. No. 20, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 689 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at para. 46 (F.C.J.): “In my view, a proper interpretation of the … agreements does
not support the view that the City was required by those agreements to provide the Province with a
transportation system. … [They] are framework funding agreements which govern the manner in
which funds for approved projects are to be disbursed and administered.”
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issue of distinguishing between public purpose grants and consideration
for a supply was not discussed, nor was Des Chênes or any other case
that had dealt with this distinction. The court simply suggested that unless the funding was paid in return for a contractual obligation to provide
specific supplies, which are transferred to the Province, the funding
would not amount to consideration for a supply. As Pelletier J. noted,
“[T]here is nothing in … [the agreements] which requires the City to
construct anything whatsoever. … [I]t is … an error to construe these
agreements in such a way so as to make the City the Province‟s general
contractor for the construction of a municipal transit system.”156
5. Supreme Court157
The City was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court dismissed the City‟s appeal in a unanimous decision
written, as perhaps has become obvious from the review of the previous
cases, by the Court‟s leading tax member, Rothstein J. The Court dealt
with the case as largely a question of whether the City was making, for
the purposes of the GST, a single or multiple supplies. It held that the
City was making only a single supply, namely, the supply of municipal
transit services. Therefore, all of the inputs into this supply, including the
acquisition and building of transit facilities, were part of the single
supply of these services. Since these supplies, the municipal transit
services, were exempt under the GST no input tax credits were allowed.
As Rothstein J. explained:
The City made only one supply: the exempt supply of a municipal
transit system to the public. Fulfilling the accountability obligations
under the funding agreements with the Province did not result in a
separate supply to the Province. The acquisition and construction of
transit facilities was an input to the single supply of the municipal
transit service to the Calgary public.158

The most frequently cited case in Canada on the issue of whether a
transaction amounts to a single or multiple supplies has been the Tax
Court judgment of Rip J. (as he then was) in O.A. Brown Ltd. v.
Canada.159 In that case, Rip J. said that in making this determination,
156
157
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Calgary, supra, note 19.
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“The test to be distilled from the English authorities is whether, in
substance and reality, the alleged separate supply is an integral part,
integrant or component of the overall supply”. And, “[O]ne should look
at the degree to which the services alleged to constitute a single supply
are interconnected, the extent of their interdependence and intertwining,
whether each is an integral part or component of a composite whole”.160
These observations are invariably cited in cases on this issue and
Rothstein J. dutifully quotes them. He then notes that if the approach in
O.A. Brown is followed, “the public transit facilities would not be a
separate supply, but would be an input to, or part and parcel of, the
supply of the municipal transit service to the Calgary public”.161
In support of his holding that “the alleged separate „transit facilities
services‟ supply is an integral part … of the overall supply of „public
transit services‟”, he cited a number of factors that should be considered
in determining whether individual elements being supplied should be
treated as a single supply. These factors include: if the alleged separate
supply is simply “work of a preparatory nature to another supply” (in this
case he found that transit facilities services “was work of a preparatory
nature to the supply of a municipal transit service to the public”); if the
alleged supply is not a distinct element (in this case he found that “the
alleged separate supplies are so interconnected that it would be difficult
to identify distinct elements or components”); and, if the alleged supply
does not result in a stand-alone good or service (in this case he found that
the “transit facilities have no use and provide no service except to the
extent to which they are deployed for use within the Calgary municipal
transit service”).162
The City argued that the single supply concept could not apply where
there were two separate recipients. Therefore, Rothstein J. went on to
consider whether or not the Province received a separate and distinct
benefit from the City. In finding that it did not, he noted that the Province
was under no statutory obligation to provide transit services for the public in its cities. The relevant legislation simply provided that the Province
could assist in funding the cost of such facilities. Moreover, once the facilities were completed, title to the facilities was vested in the City, not
the Province. He agreed with the Federal Court of Appeal that the correct
interpretation of the contracts between the City and the Province was that
160
161
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they were simply agreements to provide funding for which the City
would be responsible and not contracts for the supply of a service. Moreover, he added that “[w]hether or not the Province is a recipient of the
supply in addition to the public, the supply is of a municipal transit service to the public, and is therefore exempt”.163 Consequently, he
concluded that the City was not entitled to claim input tax credits for the
GST that it paid in acquiring and constructing the transit facilities, even
though it had received funding for the project from the Province.
6. Analysis
This case does not resolve any important policy or interpretive issue
relating to the GST and it is puzzling that the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the appeal, in particular since the decision is no longer directly relevant to municipalities given they are now entitled to receive a 100 per cent
public service body rebate on the GST they pay.164
In holding that there was only a single supply in the case, the
Supreme Court drew its reasoning from established cases. When the Tax
Court of Canada first confronted this issue under the GST, it borrowed
heavily from the U.K. and E.U. jurisprudence in establishing a test for
making the distinction.165 The Supreme Court simply confirmed some of
the key factors to be considered in distinguishing single from multiple
supplies.
On the issue of when a transfer payment (a grant, contribution, subsidy and similar payment) should be treated as consideration for a supply,
the Supreme Court did clarify the reach of the Federal Court of Appeal‟s
decision in Des Chênes.166 That case had suggested that if a municipality
has a legal obligation to use a provincial subsidy for a particular purpose,
then that was a sufficient link to find that the subsidy was consideration
for a supply, in that case the supply of school bus services. In this case, in
holding that the agreements between the Province and the City were
more in the nature of “accountability agreements” (to ensure public
grants were applied for their intended purpose), instead of “supply of
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service agreements”, the Supreme Court made it clear that just because
conditions are attached to a transfer payment to make sure it is being
used for its intended purpose, this will not necessarily mean it will be
treated as consideration for a supply. Justice Rothstein did not deal at
length with Des Chênes, but simply stated that “to the extent that Des
Chênes is inconsistent with this reasoning, it should not be followed”.167
Both of the issues of applying the GST that the Court dealt with in
this case have been litigated in dozens of cases, and the Court‟s decision
will do little to assist in resolving the issues when they arise in future
cases. What the case highlights is the need to make the GST (or any tax
base) as comprehensive as possible. The unsolvable problem of distinguishing with any consistency between single or multiple supplies only
arises because the GST applies differently to different goods and services. If the GST tax base were comprehensive, the issue would not arise.
Also, if the tax base were comprehensive, all the supplies made by the
non-profit and public sector entities would be taxable like those made by
any other business. There is no convincing policy or administrative reason for not taxing all of their supplies (like transit services); the decision
not to tax them on the value of all their supplies is purely political.168

VI. MAKING A CONCESSION TO COMMON SENSE
The premise of our introduction, headed “A Failure of Leadership”, is
that the courts have a vitally important role to play in the tax policy
process and that the Supreme Court has failed to discharge its
responsibility of demonstrating to lower courts how this role should be
played. Invariably there will be gaps, ambiguities and conflicts in
legislation designed to implement legislative policy. The role of the judge
is to complement the work of the legislature by ensuring that these gaps
are filled, ambiguities settled and conflicts resolved in a way that furthers
the objectives of the legislated public policies. In tax cases, the Supreme
Court seems to think that the best way to do this is by refusing to engage in
a serious analysis of the possible purposes of the legislation it is
interpreting or the consequences of its decisions in terms of the furtherance
of well-established and well-understood tax principles. Instead, the justices
seem to think they can deduce the correct result simply by relying on the
167
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plain meaning of words or the Court‟s statements in prior cases. This
encourages lower courts to engage in the same kind of analysis and it
encourages counsel before the Court to rely on what they think counts as
formal legal analysis and to ignore a serious analysis of the purposes of the
legislation and consequences of alternative holdings.
What is striking about the cases for the 2012 docket is that the Court
appears so convinced of the determinacy of language as reflected in the
plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation that it does not even
allude to the purpose of the legislation or the consequences of alternative
holdings, let alone take these matters seriously or struggle explicitly with
them. Indeed, it does not even refer to common sense considerations in
justifying its decisions. Who would think that it would be good common
sense to interpret a section of the Act that reflects both sound tax policy
and tax expenditure policy (as it relates to part-time farmers) in a way
that essentially debilitates the provision? Who would think that it would
be good common sense to formulate a test for the residency of trusts for
tax purposes that essentially makes the location of their residence
voluntary? Or, who would think that in an age in which the largest
multinational corporations on the planet have been able to avoid paying
much or any tax anywhere in the world on their record profits, it would
make good common sense to insist that they be given even greater
leeway in structuring their internal transactions to justify their taxminimizing transfer prices?
The Supreme Court continually insists that it has to adopt a method
of interpretation in tax cases that yields predictability and consistency. It
is doubtful that the plain meaning approach achieves these ends. Indeed,
it is demonstrable that it does not. Nevertheless, even conceding that it
might, surely in some cases those values must yield to other values such
as furthering the purposes of the public policies underlying the design of
the legislation; reaching results that reflect the principles animating a
fair, efficient and administrable tax system; and making concessions to
brute common sense.

